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     Abstract 
 
The Somali state, in the early years of independence, was defined by grandiose ambition of 
pan-Somali nationalism. For many ordinary Somalis and their nascent government, the state-
formation project was incomplete since, at independence, only two out the five Somali 
inhabited territories were able to unite. The ambition to unify the Somali nation into one 
‘Greater Somalia’ was at first given a symbolic representation in the Somali flag; 
constitutionally provided for and later sought through violent means. Five decades after 
independence, the Somali state did not only tragically collapse but also fragmented into 
numerous polities or ‘clan enclaves’. This study aims to investigate the circumstances that led 
to this situation by asking the question: What are main factors that explain the fragmentation 
of the Somali state and emergence of multiple, divergent polities following the collapse of the 
state? The study will employ process-tracing method to establish the causal mechanisms (i.e. 
intervening variables) that link causes to their outcomes. Furthermore, I will employ the 
theories of path dependency and critical junctures to analyse the case. The study found out that 
the factors responsible for the collapse and fragmentation of the state are myriad and complex. 
They range from negative experiences and legacies rooted in the past (e.g. colonial legacy) to 
post-independence state repression, corruption, clannism, and bad governance; to external 
regional interferences and proxy wars; ill-advised international policies; war economy; the war 
on terror; lack of a strong, visionary leadership; clan politics; poverty, corruption; radicalism; 
and so on. Similarly, the factors attributable for the divergent outcomes in different regions e.g. 
the South and the North (Somaliland and Puntland) include: differences in pre-colonial social 
organizations; different experiences in colonial rule; different clan structures; leadership factor; 
the role of traditional authorities; external interventions; extremism; and the development of a 
war economy.   
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                                              Chapter One 
 
1.0. Introduction 
 
1.1.Problem Statement 
 
The erstwhile republic of Somalia’s contemporary sorry state of affairs began nearly three 
decades ago when armed opposition rebels overthrew the government of General M.S. Barre. 
Leadership disputes among the leaders of the rebel groups and deep clan divisions led to 
uncontrolled anarchy, deaths, destruction, hunger and displacement. A Hobbesian era of all 
against all defined by armed clan factions and warlordism reigned. Somalia became a collapsed 
state, defined by Rotberg (2003: 5) as “a rare and extreme version of a failed state. (…). a mere 
geographical expression, a black hole [where] there is a dark energy, but the forces of entropy 
have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital 
political goods to the inhabitants (no longer the citizens)”.   
In the wake of the violence and famine, the first response to the crisis came, in 1992, in the 
form of massive UN mandated humanitarian military intervention (UNOSOM I & II). 
Although the mission mitigated the effect of the famine, it tragically failed to restore peace or 
establish a political order leaving behind, in 1995, a country still in a state of statelessness and 
conflict (kapteijns, 2013; Möller, 2009; Voorhoeve, 2007; Ahmed and Green, 1999). Ever 
since, the dynamics of the conflict and actors involved have significantly evolved. International 
peacebuilding and state-building efforts (including military intervention) have been numerous, 
diverse but tragically unsuccessful-over 15 futile attempts have been made-the efforts 
producing only two dysfunctional transitional political order from 2000 to 2012 (Pham, 2013; 
Menkhaus, 2003). The current federal government, which came to power through an indirect 
election process in January 2017, is internationally recognized and supported, but faces 
enormous political and security challenges. It is supported by over 20, 000 AU peacekeeping 
mission (AMISOM) against its daily battle with Al-Shabaab who wants to overthrow it. 
Politically the country is experimenting with federal structure of governance and remains not 
only fragile but also fragmented. The formation of four new federal states in the South and 
central regions of the country are largely based along clan lines. The carving up of the Somali 
territory into ‘clan enclaves’ paradoxically stands in a sharp contrast to the grandiose Somali 
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nationalism of uniting the Somali people in the Horn of Africa into one ‘Greater Somalia’ that 
had defined early statehood formation and have largely contributed to the demise of the state.  
While the picture painted above have defined the fate of the South and central regions of 
Somalia, the same cannot be said about the northern regions of the country. Two polities have 
emerged out of the ashes of the state collapse and are remarkably peaceful and relatively better 
governed. In the Northwest, Somaliland has declared independence in 1991 and has ever since 
blossomed, incrementally, into a relatively stable, functioning democracy though it remains 
internationally unrecognized. Similarly, in the Northeast, the regional state of Puntland has 
since its formation in 1998 as an autonomous state that wish to be part of a unified federal 
Somali state, maintained internal stability and made progress in self-governance. Remarkably, 
the societies in both cases have organized themselves with little outside assistance and 
employed traditional clan based ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding and state-building mechanisms to 
create effective political and administrative structures that meet their local needs (Johnson and 
Smaker, 2014; Pham, 2013). 
It is against this background that this research will undertake detail inquiry into what caused 
the Somali state to collapse; why the problem has endured; why did peacebuilding and state-
building failed in some regions and worked in others; what led to the emergence of multiple 
polities and so on. To locate the case study into the wider study of conflicts in Africa, I will 
provide a selection of theoretical overview of the theories of conflicts such as Azar’s theory of 
Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs), Greed and Grievance theory; theory of war economy and 
theory of external interventions. Then, I will employ the theories of path dependency and 
critical junctures as my analytical framework. While the first three theories will offer us 
insights into the factors that cause and fuel conflicts, they do not offer any explanation as to 
the causal links of these factors. Moreover, they do not shade any light on the critical junctures 
that shaped or changed the trajectory of the crisis and produced divergent path dependent 
outcomes for our case study; hence, limiting a deeper comprehension of why things are how 
they are today and how the lessons learned can be of helpful to find a sustainable solution to 
the crisis. This is where the theories of path dependency and critical junctures come in and fill 
the gap.  
Furthermore, previous studies have devoted very little consideration to the causal links and 
dynamics of the social, political and economic environment (both internal and external) in 
which the Somali crisis has unfolded. Accordingly, the inclination has been to offer mono-
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causal, isolated and reductionist accounts, which, in turn, end up with a single and quick fix 
proposals. Their analytical tool lacks the explanatory power to delineate a complex and 
multidimensional crisis like that of Somalia. It is, therefore, in avoidance of this shortcoming 
that this study aims to take the above-mentioned holistic approach, especially, given that the 
conflict has remained unresolved to this day. And this is one of the contribution of this study. 
To achieve this goal, the study project will be guided by the following research questions. 
 
1.2. Research Questions 
 
What are main factors that explain the fragmentation of the Somali state and emergence of 
multiple, divergent polities following the collapse of the state?  
What were the underlying sources of the intrastate civil strife in Somalia? 
What factors are responsible for the enduring nature of the civil conflict in the Somalia? 
Why has international endeavour to peacebuilding and state-building failed to work? 
What factors are attributable for the relative success of Somaliland and Puntland in their 
peacebuilding and state-building efforts?  
 
1.3.  Purpose of the Study 
 
The overall purpose of this research project is to investigate the main reasons behind the 
fragmentation of the Somali state that led to the emergence of multiple, divergent Somalia(s) 
after the collapse of the state.  
The specific purpose of the study will be to explain: 
The underlying sources of the Somali conflict; the factors that were responsible for the 
protraction of the conflict; the failure of internally led peacebuilding and state-building in the 
South and central regions; and finally to examine why Somaliland and Puntland have 
succeeded where the South and central regions have failed.   
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1.4. Significance of the Study 
 
The significance of this research project is of two-fold. One, the study adopts an innovative 
theoretical framework (path dependency and critical junctures theories) in the analysis of the 
Somali crisis since the existing scholarship have fallen short of offering sufficient and 
satisfactory explanations. In this sense, the study aims to fill the gap by undertaking a holistic 
investigation and analysis that offers a deeper understanding of what transpired; why resolution 
of the crisis has become elusive; why some regions are relatively more stable and so on. In this 
respect, the study aims to advance not only the academic discussion on the Somali case but 
also the overall debate on conflict, state failure, peacebuilding and state-building in the African 
continent and, perhaps, beyond.  
Second, and more importantly, the study has a number of policy implications. Somalia is a 
constant reminder to policy makers that if a state is allowed to fail completely and for a long 
time, it increasingly becomes cumbersome to reconstitute it (Menkhaus, 2011). The numerous 
challenges that emanate from such states, notwithstanding their insignificance and remoteness, 
can pose serious social and security threats to the region and beyond. The recent events 
elsewhere (the Middle East) is a testament to this claim. The protracted nature of the Somali 
conflict had forced the Somalis to endure years of the worst form of humanitarian tragedy. 
Similarly, Somalia has imported insecurity and refugees beyond its borders compounding the 
problems of an already volatile region; piracy has for years disrupted the free flow of maritime 
commerce; and less talked about ecological disaster due to massive deforestation is taking 
place. 
More crucially, as Somalia has, since the last decade, became a battleground for terrorism and 
counterterrorism; and as the conflict has increasingly developed an international dimension, it 
is necessary now more than ever for the international community to steer its concerted efforts 
towards finding a durable and sustainable solution to the debacle. It is in this spirit that this 
research offers policy makers and practitioners in the field important lessons that might be 
useful in their current and future engagement in Somalia since only the right diagnosis of the 
problem can result in the prescription of the right solutions.  
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1.5. Research Design and Methodology 
 
To come up with satisfactory answers to the pertinent questions raised in this research study 
will require a qualitative approach in the form of an in-depth single case study. This approach 
is suitable for this particular case as it offers a powerful way to gain rich and contextual 
comprehension of the phenomena under study in a way that other techniques cannot.  
This study will employ process-tracing method, specifically, case-centric process tracing due 
to the complexity, specificity and multifaceted nature of our case study. Process tracing is a 
method used to study when the goal of a single case study is to trace causal mechanisms in 
order to make causal inference in a case study (Beach and Pederson, 2013). Causal mechanisms 
are intervening variables that connect causes to outcomes (Mahoney, 2012). According to 
Mahoney, process tracing is possibly the most significant tool of causal inference in qualitative 
and case studies. This is because tests related to process tracing aids a researcher to determine: 
the occurrence of a particular event or process; that a distinct event or process happened after 
the initial one; and that the first one caused the last. Moreover, it allows the investigation of 
“complex causal relationships such as those characterized by multiple causality, feedback 
loops, path dependencies, tipping points, and complex interaction effects” (Falleti, 2006). The 
above characterizations are true for the problem under investigation.  
A point of contention, however, for the use of process tracing is how to determine the starting 
and ending point of the phenomena under discussion. Whereas the end point is simpler to 
determine since it is largely dependent on the outcome of interest, there are disagreements 
about whether critical junctures or only contingent events should be the basis of starting points 
(Falleti, 2006). Moreover, connection of the two points require a deep understanding of the 
case. Because “familiarity with the history, historiography, and politics of the cases of study 
makes it possible to avoid problems of selection bias and to improve the validity and reliability” 
(Ibid: pg. 6). In our case study, the era of colonial rule will mark as the starting point since, I 
will argue, this was both a contingent event and a moment of critical juncture. In addition, the 
lived experience and extensive knowledge of the researcher about the case study settles the 
familiarity issue.   
As for sources of data, the research will largely use secondary sources of data. Historical 
documents and books on Somali society, culture and politics will be used to offer background 
information on the topic. Then literature on intrastate conflicts, war economy, protracted social 
conflicts, and peacebuilding, state-building and so on will be utilized to form the basis for the 
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research’s theoretical framework. Moreover, sources relevant to the case study such as 
academic books, peer-reviewed articles, journals, will be gathered, synthesised and analysed. 
In addition, policy documents from regional and international organization (e.g. UN, AU, 
IGAD, ICG, and WB), reports, and media publications will be used. I will use qualitative 
interpretive technique for the analysis of the data.   
 
     1.6. Organization of the Thesis 
 
Apart from this introductory chapter, this paper will consist of six other chapters. Chapter two 
will review relevant literature as well as discuss theories pertinent to this study. Chapter three 
will set the stage by offering brief overview of the socio-economic and political history of pre-
colonial Somali society. Then, the 19th century colonial era will be discussed followed by post-
colonial independent Somali statehood until the collapse of the state in 1991. Chapter four will 
offer detailed account of the main factors that were found to be responsible for the causes of 
the conflict and also those that fuelled the crisis. Chapter five will take the reader through post-
state collapse regional and international responses to the Somali crisis, beginning with the UN 
humanitarian intervention (1992-5) to the many regional diplomatic efforts to peacebuilding 
and state-building to some of the military interventions including unilateral invasions of 
neighbouring countries and AU peacekeeping missions. Chapter six will discuss the process 
that led to the emergence of Somaliland and Puntland out of the ashes of the Somali debacle. 
Finally, chapter seven will wrap up the study by discussing, summarises and analysing the topic 
in order to provide answers to the research questions posted in chapter one and will conclude 
the study.  
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                                                       Chapter Two 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will provide a brief overview of the existing 
academic literature and debates concerning on conflicts in Africa and their causes. The second 
part will discuss the theoretical frameworks that will form the basis for our analysis. 
 
     2.1. Literature Review  
 
2.1.1. Internal Conflicts in Africa: Characteristics and Causes  
 
One of the most thorough scholarly works that is central to this thesis is Micheal E. Brown’s 
1996 book entitled: The causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict. In this book, 
Brown explores three sets of issues: the origins of internal conflicts, their regional dimensions 
and international endeavours to deal with the consequences of internal wars (Brown, 1996). To 
begin with, he defines internal conflict as “violent and potentially violent political disputes 
whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systematic factors, and where 
armed violence takes place or threatens to take place within the borders of a single state” 
(Brown, 1996: 1). Brown admits that, in majority of the cases, the main actors in internal 
conflicts are governments and rebel groups. However, he argues, other actors or groups fight 
each other in a “Hobbesian universe of their own” when the state structures are weak or absent 
(Ibid: 1).  
Brown, further, identifies several characteristics of internal conflicts which make their study 
important. First, he argues that since the end of the Second World War, internal conflicts have 
become the most prevalent form of conflicts in the international system. In particular, Africa 
has witnessed more than its fair share of this type of conflicts. For instance, in a study, Elbadawi 
and Sambanis (2002) found that Africa has experienced the most intense, highest incidence 
and bloodiest civil conflicts since the end of the cold war. Second, they are characterised by 
unprecedented civilian sufferings, displacements and casualties. Armed groups deliberately 
target innocent civilians from rival groups as a strategy to remove them from disputed 
territories. Moreover, it is common to employ rape, intimidation and kidnappings as 
instruments of war. In some cases, the conflict results in massacres, ethnic cleansing and 
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genocides (e.g. Rwanda in 1994). Third, internal conflicts have regional dimensions i.e. they 
“affect and involve neighbouring states”. (Brown, 1996: 3). Due to the massive displacements 
of civilians, internal conflicts result in exodus of refugees into neighbouring countries, which 
pose economic, and security challenges to the host states. For instance, the civil war in Somalia 
has displaced over one million people into neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen as well as 
forcing many others to flee to Europe, Middle East and North America. Fourth, internal 
conflicts can impact distant states and threaten their national interest and that of international 
organizations. Again, piracy, terrorism and refugees resulting from decades of lawlessness and 
state failure in Somalia have impacted many countries in Africa and beyond.  
On the causes of internal conflicts, Brown’s main argument is what he referred to as ‘elite-
level activities’ which he means poor leadership. In this effect, Brown (1996: 23) argues that 
political leaders’ decisions and actions “are usually the catalysts that turn potentially volatile 
situations into violent confrontations”. In conjunction with this, he treats outside interference 
particularly of bad neighbours, as a proximate source of civil wars, which are more important 
than the spill over effects the conflict has on the neighbouring states. Brown further contends 
that it is imperative to understand, for purposes of conflict resolution, the reasons why 
neighbouring states may get involved in internal conflicts. He distinguishes between four 
different reasons. Humanitarian interventions, which aims to alleviate the human tragedy of 
the war and to restore peace and security; defensive interventions whose objective is to protect 
one’s national security resulting from the spill over effect of the conflict; protective 
interventions meant to defend fellow ethnic groups from persecution; and finally, opportunistic 
interventions are geared towards advancing political, economic and security interests. Though 
outside interference from neighbouring countries did cause the conflict in Somalia, in many 
cases opportunistic interventions and regional proxy wars have exacerbated the conflict.  
Apart from Brown, the ubiquity of intrastate conflicts had attracted the attention of many 
scholars who investigated their origins (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Collier, 2000; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004; Elmi and Barise 2006; Osman, 2007). One strand of the debate about the 
origins of internal conflicts that had gained early traction was that of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic’ 
politics. A dominant discourse has been that, with the end of the cold war, many deep-seated 
and historical ethnic or tribal feuds which were put on a lid by authoritarian regimes had been 
unleashed (Keen, 2000). Within the ethnicity literature, two explanations are offered. One 
group called the ‘primordialists’ considers ethnicity as primordial (entrenched group identity 
that is fixed). The other group known as the ‘instrumentalists’ regards ethnicity as an 
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instrument or a tool manipulated by the political elite to mobilize groups in order to gain power 
and resources (Porto, 2002). Therefore, the ‘ethnicity’ view holds that ‘ancient hostilities’ 
among people of different ethnic extractions or their manipulations were attributable as the 
main cause of intrastate wars. However, while recognizing the centrality of ethnicity in 
contemporary African conflicts, many scholars have challenged the above view and rejected it 
as simplistic or reductionist (Keen, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Porto, 2002; Levy and 
Thompson, 2010). They postulate that the underlying sources of contemporary wars in Africa 
are numerous and complex. In this sense, according to this literature, an emphasis on such a 
narrow discourse or what Porto (2002) referred to as the “tyranny of single-cause” account of 
conflicts is unhelpful or even profoundly damaging for policy. In the case of Somalia, clan 
identity has played a role in the conflict since political elites have used it to advance their 
individual interests but is not the only factor in the conflict.   
 
          2.1.2. Greed versus Grievance Hypothesis 
 
Another strand, which has featured prominently in the conflict debate, was the ‘greed-versus-
grievance hypotheses. In brief, the ‘grievance thesis’ which has dominated the narrative on the 
underlying sources of conflicts has been popularized by scholars who posited that grievances 
emanating from economic inequality; ethnic or religious fissures; political repression; social 
exclusion; and historical hostilities are the main causes of internal conflicts (Collier, 2000; 
Porto, 2002). Recently, the ‘grievance thesis’ was challenged by scholarship from the political 
economy field. Led by Paul Collier, these scholars argue that armed rebellion is not mainly 
triggered by groups’ motives or ‘grievances’ but by economic opportunities or ‘greed’ (Collier, 
2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For instance, using econometric model, a study by Collier 
(2000: 92) concluded that it is ‘greed’ more than ‘grievances’ that best explains the causes of 
conflicts particularly dependence on export commodities is a risk factor or the availability 
“lootable” resources which generate predatory taxation or extortion for rebels.  
Furthermore, Collier contends that rebel groups’ assertion of being motivated by grievances 
should not be taken at face value as they are designed for external public relations and an 
instrument for more rebel recruitment but rather their actions (i.e. material opportunity) should 
be analysed. However, the ‘greed hypothesis’ is not without contention. For example, Porto 
(2002) calls for the rejection of the ‘greed theory’ as the chief cause of conflicts on the basis 
of the previously mentioned “tyranny of single-cause” analysis. Quoting Jabri, Porto (2002: 
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14) posits that conflicts are “multi-causal” in nature and their onsets are not reducible to single 
factor determinants. In addition to ‘ethnicity’ and ‘greed’ and ‘grievances’, other studies have 
attributed intrastate conflicts in Africa to other causes: colonial legacy (Issa-Salwe 1996; 
Fawole, 2004; Elmi and Barise, 2006), state weakness, poor governance, corruption and 
authoritarian rule (Holisti, 1996 and Kaldor, 1999 in Porto, 2002; Fawole, 2004); poverty and 
economic underdevelopment resulting in competition for scarce resources (Elbadawi and 
Sambanis, 2000; Elmi and Barise, 2006; Osman, 2007) among others. Throughout the thesis, I 
will discuss how the ‘greed and grievances hypotheis’as well as other abovementioned causes 
fit into the Somali conflict.  
 
2.1.2. External interventions 
 
Some scholars have identified external dimensions of a conflict as a crucial factor in explaining 
the way a conflict unfolds. The role of international actors has, particularly, been very 
significant in the dynamics of Somali conflict, hence, the need to explore it in this case study. 
But, before delving further into reviewing the literature on the impacts of external interventions 
on conflicts, it is imperative to, first, define the concept of external intervention. Broadly, 
intervention occurs when one state meddles into the internal affairs of another sovereign state 
(de Mesquiito, 2006 in Malito, 2013). There are three forms of interventions i.e. humanitarian 
or economic intervention; diplomatic intervention; and military intervention (direct and 
indirect). All these three forms are self-explanatory and therefore no need to explain them in 
detail. This study will use ‘external (or international) intervention’ with their prefix 
(humanitarian, diplomatic and military) in reference to each of them. The Somali conflict has 
experiences all the three forms of external interventions and how each one of them have 
impacted the course of the conflict will be discussed. 
Since the end of the cold war, regional and international powers have intervened in civil wars. 
The results have been mixed. While some interventions have successful (e.g. Bosnia, 
Mozambique), others have ended up in failure (e.g. Somalia, Congo) (Voorhoeve, 2007; Doyle 
and Sambanis, 2000; Fawole, 2004). This has led a plethora of writers to examine whether 
international interventions in conflicts help or hurt the prospect of achieving peace. Most of 
these scholars start their investigation from the assumption that the objective of external actors 
is to manage or alleviate the conflict situation either by (militarily) supporting one party against 
the other or by (diplomatically) facilitating dialogue or reconciliation among the warring 
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parties (Regan, 2000: 3). Therefore, the interveners’ intention is not to prolong or aggravate 
the conflict (Regan, 1996). Moreover, these studies consider the impact of external 
interventions on the duration of internal conflicts (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 1999, 2000; 
Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000; Regan, 2002; Collier et al. 2004). There are two opposing views 
on this.  
On the one hand, some scholars argue that external interventions have the effect of prolonging 
internal conflicts (Regan, 1996, 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000). For instance, Regan 
(2002) offers one of the most comprehensive empirical analysis of this subject using a large 
dataset comprising of 150 conflicts spanning a period of over 50 years (1945-1999). He 
concludes that international interventions, in general, prolong the duration of a civil conflict. 
Similarly, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000: 10), reach the same conclusion i.e. “external 
interventions are associated with longer-lasting wars”.  
On the other hand, other writers advance a contradictory view: that international interventions 
manage conflicts either by facilitating dialogue and reconciliation or supporting one side in 
order to change the balance of power (Malito, 2013). As a result, the duration of the civil 
conflict is shortened particularly under some circumstances such as neutrality or biasedness of 
the intervener; whether support is for the government or rebels; whether intervention is 
unilateral or multilateral and so on (Collier et al. 2004; Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000). For 
example, Collier et.al (2004: 24) argues that the “duration of a conflict is systematically related 
to both structural conditions prevailing prior to conflict [internal] and to circumstances during 
conflict [including military intervention]”. He identifies external military support on the side 
of the rebels as having the impact of shortening the conflict.  
In addition, research on international intervention identify conditions under which 
interventions are likely to succeed or not. In this respect both the characteristics of the civil 
conflict (ethnic, religious, ideological, separatist) and the disputants (Regan, 1996, 2002); 
geopolitical environment in which the conflict unfolds (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000); as 
well as the strategies (military, diplomatic/economic or mixed), the types 
(unilateral/multilateral) and the goals of the interventions (opportunistic or constructive) 
(Malito, 2013; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000) are crucial in determining the outcome and 
duration of the conflict. For instance, Elbadawi (1999) finds that the level of poverty and 
political rights as important factors that determine the outcome of a conflict. Similarly, Collier 
et.al. mentions ethnic division, while, Regan (2002) indicates democracy as important in this 
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regard. Similar logic is advanced by Voorhoeve (2007) who argues that the re-establishment 
of the rule of law (read peace) is determined by: the type of conflict that ensued, the pre-conflict 
regime type and the type of peace (or intervention) that take place.  
Although the literature on the relationship between international intervention and conflict 
duration shows a correlation, it does not proof causality. It could be a case of reverse causality 
i.e. outside interventions tend to occur when conflicts become protracted rather than the 
intervention being prolonging the conflict (Regan, 2002). Similarly, Fortna (2004) criticizes 
these studies for engaging in selection bias, i.e. they generally investigate cases where there 
are interventions. What would be the outcome if there was no external intervention? This is a 
major weakness in these studies which cannot be generalized to all conflicts. Therefore, 
individual case studies is required to determine the degree to which external intervention 
influences the outcome of a particular conflict. 
 
     2.2. Theoretical framework 
 
There are a number of theories from numerous fields that are pertinent to elucidating the reality 
of the Somali conflict. While theories such as Azar’s PSC are commonly used and will be used 
in our case, they are not sufficient to explain the causal mechanism that link chain of events to 
the outcome. It is in this respect that this study will further employ the theories of path 
dependency and critical junctures as analytical tools to offer a more in-depth understanding of 
the Somali crisis and hence answer the research questions.  
 
          2.2.1 Protracted Social Conflict: Edward Azar’s Theory 
 
 
A key feature of protracted social conflict (PSC) is its enduring nature. It defies all efforts by 
those engaged in peacebuilding to resolve it. Dr. Edward Azar’s seminal works stretching over 
a period of two decades have laid the foundation for the study of PSC. His theory of PSC is the 
most commonly used among scholars in the field of conflict resolution studies. In this case 
study, Azar’s theory will be used to offer an analytical framework in order to give powerful 
insights, not only, into the underlying sources of the nearly three decades’ long conflict in 
Somalia but also the dynamics and drivers of the conflict. 
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According to Azar PSCs arise “when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic 
needs on the basis of their communal identity” (Azar, 1990: 12). Azar’s model distinguishes 
between four clusters of variables that are preconditions for PSC to occur. They include: 
communal content; human needs; governance and state’s role; and international linkages.  
With regards to ‘communal content’ of a society, Azar posits that it is the most significant 
cause of protracted conflicts. He regards identity group (ethnicity, race, religion and culture) 
as the most useful unit of analysis in PSC (Azar, 1985 in Ramsbotham, 2005: 114). He traces 
the origin of state-society cleavages back to the colonial legacy of divide and rule as well as 
historical rivalries among different communities. These rivalries were further perpetuated after 
colonization when state power and resources were usurped by one dominant group or an 
alliance of a few who ignored the needs of other groups in their midst. As a consequence, 
tension develops among communal groups where societal relations are negatively impacted, 
ultimately leading to schism and conflict particularly if such a society is multi-ethnic (Azar, 
1990: 7).  
According to Azar, deprivation of human needs forms another basis for PSC to occur. These 
human needs are fundamental and come in diverse forms, namely, political and economic 
access needs (e.g. effective participation in decision making, markets etc.); security needs (e.g. 
protection, food and housing); acceptance needs (e.g. recognition of one’s identity group). He 
argues that individuals endeavor to satisfy the said needs collectively as identity groups. 
Deprivation of these needs result in grievances, which are again voiced collectively as identity 
groups (Azar, 1990: 9). He admits that these grievances do not trigger or ignite a protracted 
conflict per se. He asserts, however, that the authority’s failure to address them would be a 
recipe for a “prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as 
security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic 
participation” (Ibid: 93).  
In addition to ‘communal content’ and ‘human needs’, Azar identifies governance and the 
state’s role as a third important variable in his PSC cluster model. The modern state is vested 
with the power to use monopoly of violence as well as to provide, ideally, equal access to 
security and public goods to all citizens regardless of their identity. In practice, however, states 
which are susceptible to PSC are characterized by lack of sufficient resources, rapid population 
growth and poverty. Moreover, governments in these states are likely to be incompetent, fragile 
and lack the capacity to meet essential societal needs. Furthermore, political power is exercised 
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by one identity group or an alliance of a few dominant groups who utilize the state machinery 
(power and resources) to subjugate and exclude other identity groups (Azar, 1990: 10-11). The 
state’s failure to arbitrate the needs of its multi-communal society due to the aforementioned 
reasons results in a “disarticulation” between the state’s (ideal) core functions and societies 
expectations from the state (Ibid: 7). This is why, Azar stresses, developing states with 
fragmented multi-ethnic communities, weak governance institutions and authoritarian regimes 
are less likely to satisfy individuals and groups needs and are therefore more prone to 
experiencing PSC.    
Lastly, what Azar referred to as International linkages is the fourth variable attributable to 
the occurrence of PSC. This implies that, it is not only a particular state’s internal factors that 
determine its role towards satisfying the previously mentioned human needs but also a state’s 
interaction with the international system dictates its internal policies, hence, the need to 
consider this factor in the PSC analysis. Azar points out that economic dependency of a state 
on the global system impacts its autonomy to pursue internal economic policies which in turn 
affects, perhaps negatively, its capacity to meet the provision of public goods. Moreover, 
political-military client linkages between weak/poor states and strong/rich states may force the 
former to compromise internal economic and political policies which are favourable to their 
citizens or even pursue policies which injure common good (Azar, 1990). As a result, such 
economic dependency and clientele relationship might aggravate the non-satisfaction of the 
needs of some groups, distorting domestic policies “through the realignment of subtle 
coalitions of international capital, domestic capital and the State” (Ibid: 11).  
In a nutshell, Azar’s view postulates that PSC are likely to occur due to the non-satisfaction of 
certain fundamental human needs based on group’s identity. Moreover, in conjunction with 
existing circumstances such as historical rivalries/contests; colonial experience; and diversity 
of identities, a state’s internal policies and international linkages play a role in PSC. It is, 
therefore, the multifaceted nature of PSC that makes it difficult to resolve.  
This research will demonstrate how Azar’s theory of PSC have played out throughout the 
history of Somalia, starting from the time of colonial rule to this day.  
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          2.2.2. Path Dependence Theory 
 
 
Path dependence as a theoretical framework has been employed to provide insights into 
numerous social and historical phenomena and processes. While the concept of path 
dependence has its origins in historical institutionalism and economics, it has recently found 
traction in political science (Allen, 2010). Different writers have defined the concept of path 
dependence in different ways. Some employ a more general all-encompassing definition while 
others use a narrower and more specific conceptualization of path dependence. For instance, 
Paul Pierson (2000), who introduced the concept into the political science realm, postulates 
that the application of the path dependence concept oscillates between the general and specific 
models. In the general sense, it pertains to “the causal relevance of preceding stages in a 
temporal sequence” (Pierson, 2000: 252). He quotes the widely used definition of William 
Sewell (1996): "that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes 
of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time." (Sewell, 1996: 262-3 quoted in 
Pierson, 2000: 252). Basically, this implies that that history matters or past historical events 
can be used to explain the present. 
In the specific version, scholars employ a conceptualization that transcends the simple idea that 
“history matters”. Pierson asserts that path dependence, in the narrower sense, entails social 
phenomena “grounded in a dynamic of increasing returns” which means self-reinforcing or 
positive feedback processes (Pierson, 2000: 251). Furthermore, he outlines four features of path 
dependence. First, he emphasises the significance of timing and sequencing of events. Second, 
events are contingent. This means that seemingly insignificant events can have big and durable 
effects if they occur at the right time. Third, a broad gamut of outcomes are possible i.e. 
multiple equilibria is possible. Fourth, positive feedback from increasing returns may lead to 
an institutional lock-in effect i.e. inertia (Pierson, 2000: 263).  
Another influential scholar on path dependence is James Mahoney. Mahoney, in his article, 
Path Dependency in Historical Sociology (2000) decries the lack of proper definition of the 
concept and criticizes the (Sewel’s) broader conceptualization mentioned above. He defines 
path dependence as “specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into 
motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 
2000: 507). In this regard, path dependence entails not only locating a particular outcome back 
to certain historical developments but also exhibiting the stochastic nature of these historical 
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processes. Furthermore, he suggests that path dependence analysis possesses at least three 
significant characteristics, namely: causality (of antecedent events), inertia (i.e. deterministic 
causal patterns) and contingency (Mahoney, 2000: 510-11).      
Mahoney argues that scholars analyse path dependence through two main types of sequences. 
The first type analyses “self-reinforcing sequences characterized by the formation and long-
term reproduction of a given institutional pattern” or a phenomenon that Paul Pierson and other 
economists referred to as "increasing returns" (Mahoney, 2000: 508; Pierson, 2000: 252). In 
self-reinforcing sequences, early steps towards a certain course increases the probability of 
further movement along that particular direction and over time, it progressively becomes 
cumbersome to return to the reverse course. Differently stated, early adoption of a particular 
course of action will over time exclude some originally available and perhaps more efficient 
alternatives (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). The second type investigates reactive sequences. 
In these sequences, sets of events are causally linked and temporally ordered such that each 
incident is the causal chain is part of a reaction to prior incidents. Hence, the final event in the 
chain is normally the outcome of interest for the investigator and contingency of the event is 
the hallmark of its path dependence property (Mahoney, 2000: 509).  
In this study, I will employ both the general and specific definitions of the path dependence 
process in analysing the case study. Moreover, I will use both the self-reinforcing as well as 
the reactive types of sequences since considering the unfolding process from all angles will 
offer better insights than would be possible when only a single perspective is considered.  
 
          2.2.3. Critical junctures theory 
 
Although, the use of path dependence theory in our case study (the conflict in Somalia) 
insinuating that historical events in the distant past would impact the potential results of a set 
of events occurring at a future point in time (i.e. the general definition) is informative and 
interesting in itself, it is the process of tracing or locating “critical junctures” within the path 
dependency framework that will offer this study its explanatory and analytical power.   
Within the path dependency framework, critical junctures are defined as “relatively short 
periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices 
will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 348). According to this 
definition, a salient feature of critical juncture is that the time-span of the critical moment must 
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be shorter in comparison to the path dependent course it triggers. Moreover, it must results in 
the expansion of alternative options or choices for actors. And the choices made among these 
alternatives would potentially have long lasting ramifications on subsequent outcomes (ibid).  
According to Mahoney, these junctures are “critical” because the adoption of a specific choice 
will have a lock-in effect or stick and it becomes increasingly arduous to return to the original 
situation when actors had numerous choices at their disposal (Mahoney, 2000: 513). He further 
postulates that the selection process in this period is stochastically determined i.e. it is 
contingency based.    
In similar vein, Pierson argues that these “Junctures are ‘critical’ because they place 
institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter” 
(Pierson, 2000 quoted in Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007: 342). This implies that path dependence 
and critical junctures have distinct functions within the phenomenon under investigation. While 
path dependence represent an important causal instrument for the analysts, critical junctures 
signify the points of departure for several path dependent processes (Ibid).  
This dissertation aims to apply critical junctures framework. This involves the identification 
of crucial moments in the case study that had the impact of triggering path dependent processes.   
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                                                  Chapter Three 
 
3.0. The Social and Political History of the Modern Somali State 
 
     
     3.1. Introduction          
 
Any discussion that seeks to examine what ills contemporary Somali society must be based on 
some basic comprehension of the history of the socio-economic relations and political 
organizations of the Somali people starting before modern statehood was introduced i.e. pre-
colonial periods. Oftentimes, scholarly works and literature on the Somali crisis (i.e. the state 
collapse and subsequent violence) fail to provide historical accounts that shaped the emergence 
of the modern state. The vast majority of these writings begin their analysis by placing 
emphasis on the aftermath of the failure of the state as well as the bloody violence that ensued 
and the numerous attempts that followed to reconstitute the state. To contextualize the current 
state of affairs in Somalia, this section will dig deeper into the distant past to find out how the 
Somalis governed themselves long before the arrival of colonial powers. Moreover, I will 
assess how more than a century of colonization have transformed or impacted the social, 
economic and political organizations of the Somali societies. Furthermore, the section will 
cover governance in post-independence Somalia and the Somali experiment with modern 
statehood until the collapse of the state 
 
     3.2. Pre-colonial Somalia Society 
 
 
Geographically, the Somalis inhabited in the Horn of Africa, which comprises of the present 
day Somalia, Djibouti, Northern Kenya and South-western Ethiopia, for centuries. 
Ecologically, the areas they occupy are mainly arid and semi-arid with the exception of the 
fertile inter-riverine regions of Shabelle and Juba in the South which are conducive for 
agricultural activities. Although the Somalis belong to the Cushitic-speaking group, there are 
dominant myths that identify the Somalis as the descendants of Arabs (Schwoebel, 2007; 
Brons, 2001). 
 
Much of pre-colonial and colonial Somali society historiography has been dominated by 
scholarly works that have focussed on the northern part of Somalia. The foundation of this had 
19 
   
been laid by loan M. Lewis in his seminal book: A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism 
and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (1961). Lewis provides a 
detailed account of Northern Somali pastoralists culture, tradition, economy, politics and social 
interactions. Since then, numerous subsequent scholarships written by both Somalis and non-
Somalis have employed Lewis’ work as the prism through which they analysed the Somali 
culture and society (Mohamoud, 2006: Samatar, 1992). The result was the extrapolation of the 
northern pastoralist culture to the entire Somalis and hence, the portrayal of the Somalis as a 
homogenous society which shares the same culture, language, and social arrangements. 
According to this view, the Somalis are “individualistic, egalitarian, and anarchic with regards 
to institutionalisation and authority…elements of Somali ‘pastoral democracy’” (Brons, 2011: 
94). However, a number of scholars have recently challenged this representation as a myth 
pointing that Somalis in the South, who are predominantly settled agro- pastoralists, differ 
culturally, linguistically and socially from their pastoralist brethren in the North and central 
parts of the country (Mukhtar, 1996; Osman, 2007). 
 
 
          3.2.1. Clan Identity 
 
 
At the heart of the Somali political, culture and social organization is a segmentary kinship 
system. The lineage system is regarded as the most distinctive characteristics of Somali social 
organization (Brons, 2001). Membership to this kinship system is agnatically determined and 
signifies the most basic aspect of individual’s identity within society. All male individuals trace 
their lineage to a shared patrilineal line in the genealogical tree. At the apex of the lineage line 
is the ‘clan-family’, which is traceable back up to thirty generations. The clan family is divided 
into clans, then into sub-clan and sub-sub clans. The most basic unit of these networks of 
lineage relations is the dia-paying group (i.e. the blood compensation group) which share a 
common ancestry back to four to six generations and can approximately consist of a group of 
between a few hundred to a few thousand adult men The dia-paying group have the shared 
responsibility to pay to and receive compensation for murder, injury or other damages caused 
by or to other dia-paying parties from the same clan, sub-clan or other clans or sub-clans (Farah 
and Lewis, 1997: 352-3; Leonard & Samantar, 2011: 567). 
 
Generally, the vast majority of the Somalis belong to one of six clan families namely: Isaaq, 
Dir, Daarood, Hawiye, Digil and Mirifle. The first four are historically nomadic pastoralists 
and predominantly inhabit in the arid and semi-arid northern and central Somalia. They speak 
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af-maxaa (or simply maxaa) and possess similar cultures. The last two i.e. Digil and Mirifle, 
are settled agro-pastoralists in the southern part who have traditionally practised farming and 
animal husbandry along the fertile inter-riverine regions of Shabelle and Juba rivers (Hesse, 
2010; Mukhtar, 1996; Laitin and Samatar, 1987). They speak af-maaymaay (or reewin or mai) 
and variations of it (e.g. af-DaBarre; af-Jiido; af-Garre and af-Geledi). In addition, in the midst 
of the Somalis are minority groups.  In the south, among the Digil and Mirifle clans are the 
Bantus (or jareerweyne), Benadiris, Bravanis and Bajunis who engage mainly in trade, fishing, 
farming, artisanry and hunting. Some of these groups are ‘adopted’. And in the North are the 
Yaxar, Yibir, Midgaan and Tumaal who practise handcraft such as leatherwork and 
blacksmithing (Mukhtar, 1996; Schwoebel, 2007; Osman, 2007).  
 
          3.2.2. Political governance 
 
Before the advent of colonialism, the Somalis had no formal centralized authority and political 
institutions. They were a stateless society (Samatar, 1992). The decentralized and fragmented 
nature of the pre-state Somali political structure and governance was consistent with the reality 
of Northern nomadic communities. Nomadic pastoralism life required herders to constantly 
move in a harsh environment in search of water and pasture for their animals. Social order and 
governance was pursued through a combination of systems of customary laws commonly 
referred to as heer or xeer and Islamic law arbitrated by clan leaders in ad hoc gatherings 
convened whenever the need arose. Samatar (1992: 631-2) defines Xeer as “a social contract 
democratically constructed (all adult male took part in this) to check the occasional conflicts 
between individuals and among communities”. In this regard, decision-making was democratic 
since participation was open to all adult men in a council gathering called shir and agreement 
was consensus based. The role of traditional clan elders and religious individuals was to preside 
over the meetings but they had no hierarchical or formal authority/power (Walls, 2009; Issa-
Salwe, 1996; Laitin and Samatar, 1987).  However, minority groups (those unaffiliated with 
clans) and women were unrepresented in this ‘pastoral democracy’ since clan affiliation 
determined all socio-political relations. Though women were considered ‘clan-less’, they 
played “a vital role in facilitating communication, mobilizing resources, and applying informal 
pressure in favour of specific outcomes” (Walls, 2009: 377). In short, local conflict resolution 
mechanisms of negotiation, mediation and consensus entrenched in customary law were 
employed to resolve all conflicts pertaining to inter or intra clan disputes over resources, 
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murder, marriage or any other delict. The recognized and accepted principles of the xeer was 
to a large extent effective in preventing and resolving disputes (Schwoebel, 2007).  
Contrastingly, governance among the settled Southern agro-pastoralists was relatively less 
decentralized and fragmented. There were sultanates (e.g. Geledi sultanates) and chieftains 
which exerted substantial hierarchical and formal authority. Moreover, minority communities 
in coastal towns and other urban areas had salient formal political structures and legal court 
systems (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). Again, the aforementioned differences between the 
Northern nomadic pastoralists and Southern settled communities were mainly influenced by 
their differing ecological realities and political economy. Moreover, ethnic heterogeneity and 
variety of settlement patterns in the South played a role in the development of a more 
established formal political arrangement. Furthermore, while agnatic bonds informed socio-
economic and political realities among the nomads, social organization among the cultivators 
was based both on patrilineal lineage and territory (the land or village in which they have lived 
in for generations (Laitin and Samatar, 1987; Schwoebel, 2007). Even then, governance was 
decentralized, albeit, more hierarchical and formal in comparison to the Northern people. In 
essence, governance throughout pre-colonial Somali society was characterized by 
decentralization, though political organization and authority among the Southern agricultural 
clans and coastal urban dwellers was more stratified and formal than their pastoralist Northern 
cousins. Up until the arrival of colonial powers, there was no indication towards the 
development of a common centralized political entity that transcended narrow clan divisions 
(Brons, 2001; Mohamoud, 2006).   
 
     3.3. Colonialism and Colonial Rule 
 
The Somalis interaction with the outside world pre-dates the arrival of the 19th century 
European powers. Through migration, the Somalis’ contact with foreigners was limited to their 
neighbours in the South and West with whom they contested over land, water and pasture for 
their animals. However, with the spread of commercial trade in the Indian Ocean, Arab and 
Persian merchants were among the first to arrive in Somalia. These traders opened up Somalia 
to the outside world, established permanent coastal towns, intermarried with the locals and 
introduced Islam (Samatar, 2007). Others such as Portuguese explorers and Egyptian rulers in 
the North had briefly settled in Somalia.  The impact and reach of these foreign settlers was 
22 
   
limited to a few urban and coastal towns. It was only at the dawn of European rule that the 
social, political and economic institutions of the Somali society were impacted in an enduring 
manner. By the turn of the 20th century, all Somali inhabited areas were sliced up into five 
political entities and placed under the control of the British, the Italians, the French and the 
neighbouring Ethiopians (Balthasar, 2014; Samatar, 2007). For the purpose of this study, I will 
focus mainly on the parts that were placed under the colonies of the British and Italians that 
would join on independence to form the modern day republic of Somalia i.e. British Somaliland 
and Italian Somaliland respectively. 
 
          3.3.1. British Somaliland  
 
Britain’s engagement in Somaliland dates back to 1839. In this year, the British Empire had 
established a military base in the strategic town of Aden, Yemen, in order to safeguard its 
trading route to India which was an important British colony. Somaliland was located across 
the red sea from Aden where the British personnel were based and it was rich in much needed 
livestock (Issa-Salwe, 1996). Therefore, the British government sought to sign friendly treaties 
with local clan leaders in Somaliland coastal towns in order to secure a stable supply of mutton 
and other livestock products for their troops in Aden. This was initially the primary reason for 
the British involvement in Somaliland. However, in the later years of that century the strategic 
importance of Somaliland increased for Britain. This was due to the opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1869; threat from the Ethiopian expansionism and the arrival of rival European powers 
(especially France) on the coast of the red sea. As a consequence, Britain upgraded its friendly 
treaty by signing ‘protection’ treaties with several clans thereby formally making Somaliland 
a British protectorate in 1887 (Renders, 2012).    
Evidently, as Britain’s interest in Somaliland was incidental rather a well-engineered grandiose 
scheme for territorial takeover, it exercised a system of indirect rule. Colonial administration 
was limited to coastal areas. Colonial rule did not extend to the hinterland. Unlike its colonies 
elsewhere, there were no British settlers in Somaliland save for some Christian missionaries. 
The British colony stated its policy towards the new protectorate as follows: “to secure a supply 
market, check the traffic in slaves, and to exclude the interference of foreign powers” (Samatar, 
1989: 31). The territory was to self-finance on the meagre proceeds obtained from the coastal 
ports. Expenditure was to be kept in check. This meant that no investment in social and 
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economic development projects in the area (e.g. infrastructure, schools and health facilities) 
were planned for. As a result, Somaliland remained underdeveloped throughout the decades of 
colonial rule. There were very few high schools (the first secondary school was opened in 
1953); no civil servants with governance experience and no bureaucratic structures (Ibid).   
Despite their limited presence, the British faced violent resistance from a militant Dervish 
resistance movement which was led by Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan-a religious and 
nationalist sheikh whom the British nicknamed as the “Mad Mullah”. Mad Mullah and his 
Dervish army staged a sustained and fierce resistance which lasted for over 20 years (1889-
1920). Though the Dervish movement was finally crashed by the more superior force of the 
British including its airpower (the first to be used against a colony), the British were drawn 
deeper into the protectorate. The long resistance forced the administration to increase its 
presence into the interior and commit more financial and human resources. Even then, in the 
absence of a large settler population, the few colonial personnel mainly functioned to prevent 
disruption of a secure supply of livestock products to Aden. So, “political control could only 
be achieved by working with and through the clans” (Renders, 2012: 36).  
In that sense, colonial officers attempted to find clan elders with titles in order to co-opt them 
into their political and administrative hierarchy. They created the positions of salaried and 
politicised ‘chiefs’ who would be accountable to British officials in the colony in the event of 
misconduct committed by their clansmen. This resulted into burgeoning of the number of 
colonial ‘chiefs’ or titled clan elders. However, as mentioned before, the traditional Somali 
society did not function in such a hierarchical manner. The position of clan elders was merely 
symbolic. Authority was decentralized and non-hierarchical. Therefore, the politicisation of 
clan leadership created tensions which would impact not only the implementation of indirect 
rule at the time but would also have major enduring implications on latter years (Renders, 
2012).  
Due to the nomadic lifestyle of the bulk of the population, governance did not become 
pervasive. Majority of the people were in constant movement and had no permanent settlement. 
Therefore, they had minimal or no contact with British officials or their local representatives, 
making it cumbersome to institute successful governance structures especially with the limited 
available resources (Richards, 2008). Accordingly, the indirect rule of the British allowed the 
existing lineage based traditional governance structures remained largely operational and semi-
autonomous.  
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          3.2.2. Italian Somalia/colony            
 
Italy entered the race for the partitioning of the Somalia territorial cake in 1893 after Britain 
and France. Italy’s interest in Somalia contrasted sharply from that of Britain. This was 
manifested in the diverse ways they managed their colonies in terms of governance.  
Unlike their colonial counterparts in Northern Somalia, the Southern Italians erected a 
centralized bureaucratic rule that stretched beyond the urban centres and penetrated deep into 
the hinterland through a system of direct rule. Colonial administrators manned the entire colony 
down to the district level. Salaried local ‘chiefs’ who were hired for their loyalty and 
collaboration to serve the interests of Italians rather than that of their folks aided them (Logan, 
2002; Reno, 2003). Therefore, these ‘chiefs’ served as instruments for Italian rule and 
exploitation in a patronage system that would be inherited and replicated by subsequent post-
colonial administrations. Actually, it can be argued that such practices have continued to define 
the political culture of Somalia to this day (Richards, 2008).   
In contrast to Britain, Italy’s motivation to establish a colony in Somalia was more grandiose 
and multifaceted. First, Italy regarded Somalia as the perfect location from where to conquer 
her coveted prize, Ethiopia. Second, due to population pressure, the Italian government wanted 
to resettle its unemployed and poor citizens in the fertile territory of Somalia. Third, Italy was 
in search of cheap raw materials for her industries as well as overseas markets for her 
manufactured products (Mohamoud, 2006; Renders, 2008). Because of these factors, Italy 
envisioned to constitute from the beginning a fully functioning settler colony. Therefore, they 
established economic, social and administrative infrastructures to help them achieve full 
colonial control vis-à-vis their British counterpart in British Somaliland.   
 
     3.3. Independence and Self-Rule 
 
          3.3.1. Civilian Administration (1960-9) 
 
On 26 June 1960, British Somaliland gained independence from Britain and five days later 
Italian Somaliland followed suit. The two former colonies joined on July 1 1960 and became 
the republic of Somalia. The new independent administration adopted a multiparty 
representative democracy with a unicameral legislature. The legislators were to be directly 
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elected by the people to serve for a term of five years. The national assembly would in turn 
elect a president who will then appoint a premier. The premier will form the government. The 
country was divided into administrative units composed of eight regions headed by governors 
and 47 districts headed by district commissioners. The governors and district commissioners 
were appointed by the interior minister (Issa-Salwe, 1996).  
Though now merged as one country with one flag, a single executive, legislative, judiciary and 
army; the two former colonies inherited very distinct administrative, legal and education 
systems; their languages and economic structures differed too (Terdman, 2008). The plurality 
of the systems became problematic for the new state, especially, the English speaking 
northerners who came to seek employment in the relatively more developed Italian speaking 
South and the capital (Mogadishu) and at the time official Somali language script to conduct 
government business was non-existent (Balthasar, 2015; Terdman, 2008; Issa-Salwe, 1996).  
Moreover, the northerners felt short-changed in the power sharing arrangement. The South took 
key positions in the new government including the presidency; the premier; interior and finance 
ministries; the army and police chiefs as well as about three-quarter of the seats in parliament 
(Hoehne, 2011; Ahmed and Green, 1999).  
Just less than one year after the union, the people of the North had rejected the unification in a 
referendum although the combined results of both the North and the South approved the 
referendum (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 116; Hoehne, 2011). Similarly, some northern junior 
army officers attempted a botched coup d'état that aimed to break the North from the South 
(Bolthasar, 2015; Issa-Salwe, 1996). In addition, the civilian administration was characterized 
by incompetence; lack of social and economic development policies; corruption; nepotism. The 
political parties were clan based, too many, fragmented and lacked any distinctive ideologies. 
For instance, over sixty political parties and 1000 contestants participated for 123 
parliamentary seats in the 1969 elections (Balthasar, 2014; Issa-Salwe, 1996). Individuals 
sought power to enrich themselves and their kinsmen and state became the new arena for 
predatory competition for resources. Instead of addressing domestic issues, the government 
became preoccupied with the issue of bringing all the Somali people under the umbrella of one 
‘Greater Somalia’. This ideology shaped its foreign policy and meagre resources were 
channelled towards this goal (Terdman, 2008). The people became frustrated with the 
politicians and the government.  
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However, the situation suddenly changed when President Abdirashid Omar Sharmake was 
assassinated by his bodyguard. The resulting political vacuum and stalemate paved the way for 
the military to intervene and seize power in a bloodless coup in 1969 (Issa-Salwe, 1996).  
   
     3.3.2. Military Rule (1969-91) 
 
On October 21, 1969 the Somali National Army (SNA) led by Major general M.S. Barre took 
control of the republic of Somalia. The disillusioned populace enthusiastically welcomed the 
military take over and the end of nine years of civilian (mis)rule. The people saw the military 
as the only institution that can rescue the country from the economic mismanagement, 
corruption and clan based political decay that defined independent Somalia. The military 
immediately arrested top official of the former civilian administration; disbanded the 
legislature; suspended the constitution and Supreme Court; and proscribed political parties. 
Instead the country was to be governed by a 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council 
(SRC) led by Barre himself as its chairman (Issa-Salwe, 1996; Terdman, 2008).  
The military regime riding on a wave popular support embarked on broad social and economic 
reforms under the banner of ‘scientific socialism’ ideology. Official Somali language script 
was written and nationwide educational campaign improved literacy. Tribalism was 
criminalized and supplanted with Somali nationalism. The ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology was 
reinvigorated as Somalia invested heavily on its military thanks to cold war rivalry politics that 
allowed the regime easy access to financial and military aid (Issa-Salwe, 1996). This will also 
embolden the military leadership to pursue the goal of unifying the Somali nation militarily by 
waging a devastating war on Ethiopia in 1977 (see section for 4.2.1 more details).     
Notwithstanding the aforementioned initial ‘reforms’, corruption, nepotism and economic 
mismanagement became even more pervasive, hence, the regime became  a victim to the same 
vice it promised to eradicate. State resources and power were concentrated in the hands of a 
small clique close to the regime leadership. Opposition was not tolerated and any criticism of 
the regime was brutally suppressed by the repressive state security apparatus (Elmi and Barise, 
2006: Osman, 2007). In the aftermath of the Ogaden war, the military became even more 
repressive as the entire clans of the opposition leaders were meted with collective and brutal 
crackdown. The regime’s persecution of any opposition coupled with pervasive poverty and 
unemployment, activated the proliferation of more clan based armed movements in the other 
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parts of the country (Elmi and Barise, 2006; Hoehne, 2011). Ultimately, the military regime 
which ruled Somalia for 21 years with fear, suppression of freedom and ‘divide and rule’ tactics 
came on its knees in January 1991 and the state of Somalia completely collapsed as law and 
order gave way to complete chaos. 
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                                                                  Chapter Four 
 
4.0. The Somali Crisis: Underlying Sources, Dynamics and Perpetuating Factors 
  
 
The genesis of Somalia’s nearly three decades long civil strife are myriad and complex. The 
complex and protracted nature of the crisis calls for a multi-causality approach that looks into 
both internal and external factors and their interplay. Moreover, it is important to consider that 
the dynamics of the crisis has been evolving and that the sources of the debacle are not 
necessarily the same as those that perpetuate it. For instance, while warlordism and clan 
factionalism have played a leading role in the early life of the crisis, it is radicalism that defines 
the crisis today.   
 
     4.1. Underlying Sources of the Conflict 
 
There are a number of underlying sources that can be attributed to the current Somali crisis of 
state collapse and instability. Some are found in the distant past; some are internal; others are 
external; and they are all causally linked and interact with each other. They include the 
following:  
 
          4.1.1. Colonialism and its enduring legacy 
 
 
Many scholars attribute the underlying sources of intrastate civil strife in Africa to the 19th-
century colonialism of the continent by European powers and its legacy. In other words, these 
scholars postulate that contemporary new wars in Africa have their roots in the arbitrary 
partitioning of the continent into different colonies by major colonial powers (Osman, 2007; 
Mulugeta, 2009; Erikson, 2013). Somalia is no exception. Following the Berlin conference of 
1884, the area inhabited by the Somalis in the Horn of Africa was partitioned into five colonies 
controlled by three European powers, namely, France, Britain, and Italy. Two regions, 
Somaliland British protectorate in the Northwest and Northern Frontier District (what is present 
day Northern Eastern Kenya) came under the control of Britain. The South and central region 
became Italian Somaliland colony. France colonized the Northern coast which became known 
as French Somaliland. Ethiopia annexed the Ogaden region as part of a deal with the British 
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(Elmi and Barise, 2006; Mulugeta, 2009). In 1960, Southern Italian colony and Northern 
British colony gained independence and united to become modern day republic of Somalia. 
French Somaliland remained a French colony until 1977. It gained independence and became 
the modern day state of Djibouti. The Ogaden region and Northern Frontier District were 
formally recognized as part of Ethiopia (Ogadenia) and Kenya (NFD) respectively (see the map 
in appendix 1).  
Independence ushered in a new Somali republic that was the product of the union of only two 
out of the five regions that constituted the Somali peninsula. The new state found itself in what 
Dominik Balthasar (2014: 233) aptly referred to as “a country in search of a nation”. For the 
Somali nationalists and political elite, the state-making project was not yet complete until all 
the Somalis were brought under a single Somali state. The new Somali flag symbolized this 
ambition. It had a five-pointed star in the middle signifying the republic’s irredentist policy of 
unifying all the five regions under one ‘Greater Somalia’. Moreover, the Somali Constitution 
provided for the government’s desire for unification (Terdman, 2008; Balthasar, 2014). This 
quest for unification would set Somalia on a seemingly never ending collision course with her 
neighbours (Kenya and Ethiopia). The results have been devastating regional upheavals and 
rivalries whose ramifications continue to impact not only Somalia but the wider region to this 
day. 
Initially, Somalia engaged in diplomacy by lobbying the UN and the OAU in order to regain 
its land. However, diplomatic efforts failed. Especially, the OAU’s decision to safeguard the 
sanctity of colonial boundaries ended any hope of peaceful solution (Issa-Salwe, 1996). 
Accordingly, the young state embarked on a bellicose irredentist campaign. The emerging 
administration got obsessed with the question of unification; while its meagre resources were 
diverted to a massive military build-up project (Terdman, 2008: 26). Within a decade, Somalia 
became one of the biggest militarized nations on the continent. Somalia’s strategic location and 
the rivalries between the superpowers enabled it to easily access military aid (military 
equipment and training) (Osman, 2007). Moreover, the government supported separatist 
movements of ethnic Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Somalia’s aggressive 
demeanor first resulted in limited border clashes with both its neighbours and finally a major 
devastating war, commonly referred to as the Ogaden war, with Ethiopia between 1977 and 
1978 (Terdman, 2008). The Ogaden war (to be taken up below in detail later) heralded as a 
critical juncture in Somalia’s journey towards self-destruction and state collapse.  
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Furthermore, colonialism had impacted the socio-economic and political structure of 
traditional Somali society in a number of significant ways that would proof later to be 
detrimental (see more detail account in chapter 3).  
Just to mention briefly here, colonization has imposed on Somali society a highly centralized 
system of political governance that was alien to and in contradiction with their decentralized 
system of traditional structure (Doornbos and Markakis, 1994). Other effects of colonial rule 
include the commercialization of pastoral economy and its incorporation into the global 
economy which made Somalia reliant on the global market; divide and rule; favouring some 
clans over others which caused a shift in the balance of power and inequality among them; and 
corruption, exploitation and suppression. The colonial practice was inherited by the post-
colonial state (Osman, 2007; Mbugua, 2013). It  adopted the same system of “the unitary and 
highly centralised system of rule, the western model of representative government, the 
bureaucratic mode of administration, a western code of law and justice” (Doornbos and 
Markakis, 1994: 84). Moreover, the situation was aggravated by exploitative militarized 
dictatorship dominated by a small group. This led to the weakening of traditional institutions 
and customary authority as well undermining of their values and norms (Ibid: 84-6). 
Accordingly, this incompatibility of the two systems was the core of the Somali tragedy (Ibid). 
 
          4.1.2. Ill-prepared and Rushed Unification 
 
Upon the unification of the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland into the republic 
of Somalia on independence, it was regarded as a unique case of state formation due to the 
seemingly homogenous nature of its society (Balthasar, 2015). However, some Somali analysts 
trace the contemporary conflict to the union, which they claim was poorly prepared, and hastily 
arranged (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Hoehne, 2011; Balthasar, 2015). No sooner had the merger 
occurred than serious political and governance issues began to emerge. These issues were 
rooted in the distinct administrative systems the two polities experienced under colonial rule. 
Although the merger meant the formation of a unitary state with one flag, a single executive, 
legislative, judiciary and army, there were differences in official languages; legal codes; 
economic structures (currencies, taxation, fiscal and accounting practices) and other significant 
administrative systems. Instead of integrating the two systems, they were left to operate 
distinctly (Balthasar, 2015). This meant that the plurality of the systems became problematic 
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for the northerners who came to seek employment in the relatively more developed South and 
the capital (Mogadishu), the seat of the young state.  
Moreover, the northerners felt short-changed in the power sharing arrangement. The South took 
key positions in the new government including the presidency; the premier; interior and finance 
ministries; the army and police chiefs as well as about three-quarter of the seats in parliament 
(Hoehne, 2011; Ahmed and Green, 1999). Just in less than one year after the union, the 
northerners expressed their dissatisfaction by “vot[ing] ‘No’ in the unification referendum” 
although the combined results of both the North and the South approved the referendum 
(Ahmed and Green, 1999: 116; Hoehne, 2011). Similarly, some northern junior army officers 
attempted a botched coup d'état (Balthasar, 2015). Furthermore, the lack of government 
capacity or willingness to address the said challenges or other pervasive socio-economic 
underdevelopment issues inherited from colonialism led to more disillusionment and 
discontent (Ahmed and Green, 1999). At the same time, alternative venues to address the social 
injustices such as traditional structures were either relegated to the periphery or abolished by 
the state (Hoehne, 2011). The situation was further exacerbated under the military regime 
where corruption and nepotism became more widespread. State power and economic resources 
were further concentrated in the hands of a few political elites from the South. Moreover, any 
dissent was brutally suppressed with detention, torture and executions (Osman, 2007). 
Ultimately, these grievances led to the emergence of armed opposition groups from the North, 
marking the beginning of the civil war and subsequent state collapse.   
 
          4.1.3. Economic and Political Power Rivalries (Greed?) 
 
The political elite in post-independent Africa understood the intimate nexus between political 
power and economic resources. Access to political power meant access to scarce resources i.e. 
public employment, scholarships, public contracts and foreign aids; not only for themselves 
but also for their fellow clansmen. Particularly when the economy is state-controlled and 
corruption is commonplace (Stewart, 1998; Osman, 2007).  According to Frederick Forsyth 
(1977) quoted in Osman (2007: 120):  
“In Africa as elsewhere political power means success and prosperity, not only for the 
man who holds    it but for his family, his birthplace and even his whole region of origin. 
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As a result there are many who will go any length to get and having got it will surpass 
themselves in order to keep it” (pg. 25).  
In the context of Somalia, according to Elmi and Barise (2006), competition over political 
power and economic resources did not only cause the conflict but also led to its perpetuation. 
They posit that pre-colonial nomadic society in Somalia often fought over resources like water 
wells, pastureland and livestock (camels) which were essential for survival. However, such 
conflicts were resolved through established traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Ibid). 
Independence ushered in statehood and rapid urbanization which shifted resource priority for 
many Somalis who previously led a nomadic life. Like many other post-independent African 
Societies, the state became the contested arena for power and economic resources; and those 
who accessed it and their kinship became relatively powerful and wealthy (Osman, 2007). 
Accordingly, gaining and preserving political power has been a constant source of contention 
not only in Somalia but also across Africa (Ibid).  
Upon gaining independence in 1960, few elites whom the Italian colonial masters groomed 
assumed the levers of state power. These elites used their position to reward the members of 
their clans through corruption, cronyism and favouritism at the exclusion of the vast majority. 
These clans became dominant. This was true in the (supposedly democratic) civilian 
government, which ruled for nine years (1960-69), and the military regime (Ibid). The resulting 
economic inequality and social stratification was further aggravated by economic decline, 
poverty and unemployment (Mulugeta, 2009).  Expectedly, such a situation makes people to 
get “engaged in life-and death struggles, both to survive and to accumulate wealth and power” 
(Bayart, 1993 in Osman, 2007: 108). As a consequence, violent reaction becomes more likely.   
Additionally, after the collapse of the central government in 1991, greed (power and resource 
competition) a key factor that intensified the conflict. Elmi and Barise (2006) argue that, for 
example, when the military regime was overthrown, the opposition leaders could not agree to 
form a government as each one of them wanted to lead the country. Specifically, militia forces 
loyal to two of the opposition leaders (Aideed and Mahdi) who were initially united and who 
belonged to the same clan family (Hawiye) turned their artillery against one another. Elsewhere 
in the country, warlords and their marauding militiamen clashed over the control of towns and 
resources such as airstrips, seaports, fertile farms in the South and traffic checkpoints. 
Moreover, banditry, looting and pillaging of public and private properties became rampant 
(Brons, 2001; Elmi and Barise, 2006).  
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          4.1.4. Grievances from multiple sources  
 
As much as greed for power and economic resources was a factor that caused as well as 
sustained the civil war, so is grievance. Grievances stemming from multiple sources such as 
corruption, nepotism, social exclusion, economic inequality and authoritarianism. During the 
first decade of civilian rule (1960-69), a system of representative democracy was in place. 
Parties competed in a freely conducted elections and power was peacefully transferred from 
one administration to another, albeit, the system being chaotic and dysfunctional (Issa-Salwe, 
1996; Laitin and Samatar, 1987). However, the democratic system was built on clan based 
party alliances dominated by a few clans competing for a piece of the national political pie. 
Corruption was rampant as “education, employment, [and] everything was regulated in a 
nepotistic, corrupt way, according to clanism” (Hoehne, 2011: 144-45). The resulting social 
stratification and economic inequality created dissatisfaction among the majority of the 
populace who felt marginalized.  
The unpopularity of the government coupled with internal power squabbles following the 
assassination of the then president led the military to intervene in a bloodless coup. The military 
takeover received popular support and was welcomed with enthusiasm (Elmi and Barise, 2006; 
Hoehne, 2011). General Mohamed Siyad Barre who led the coup promised to fight corruption 
and clannism. The new military leader immediately dismissed the parliament, disbanded 
political parties, the judiciary and the constitution. Moreover, the independent free press was 
closed and freedom of association made unlawful. Despite this, in the first few years, the 
military regime embarked on social and economic reforms under communist inspired ideology 
dubbed ‘scientific socialism’ with some success thanks to thanks to financial aid from the 
Soviet Union (Hoehne, 2011). Moreover, the regime introduced a written Somali script and 
conducted a massive literacy campaign nationally. Kinship ties and any references based on 
clan relations were outlawed (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Issa-Salwe, 1996; Hoehne, 2011).  
Nonetheless, with the passage of time, Somalis observed that the leadership of the regime 
practiced what he preached against: clannism, corruption and cronyism. The levers of state 
power and economy were controlled an alliance of his Darood clan i.e. Marehan, Ogaden and 
Dhulbahante commonly known as MOD rule (Osman, 2007; Elmi and Barise, 2006). 
Moreover, massive military build-up in preparation of the Ogaden conflict as well as misguided 
economic policies resulted in economic stagnation and extreme poverty (Osman, 2007). 
Opposition was not tolerated and any criticism of the regime was brutally suppressed by the 
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repressive state security apparatus (Elmi and Barise, 2006: Osman, 2007). Finally, the 
accumulation of numerous years of unabated frustration over corruption, clannism, lack of 
opportunity, freedom, basic services and oppression sparked a civil war that overthrew the 
regime.  
          4.1.5. The 1977-8 Ethiopian Conflict (Ogaden Conflict) 
 
The Somali-Ethiopian conflict of 1977-78 (better known as Ogaden war) is widely regarded as 
a milestone that triggered the beginning of sequences of events that ultimately led to the 
collapse of the Somali state. The Ogaden region, located in the Eastern part of modern day 
Ethiopia, is inhabited mainly by ethnic Somalis (Tereke, 2000; Simons, 2012). The region was 
annexed by Ethiopia during the colonial period and although it was later recognized as part of 
Ethiopia in 1948 by the UN, the tension around its possession has remained a flashpoint that 
was never resolved (Simons, 2012). Post-independence Somali state actively sought to regain 
the Ogaden territory. This irredentist campaign eventually culminated into culminated into 
Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1977. While the Somali army made quick territorial gains 
and came close to attaining their ambition within a few months, it was external interventions 
that finally tipped the balance of the war in the end Ethiopia’s favour.  With over 18,000 Cuban 
troops, 1,500 Soviet military experts (with intimate knowledge about Somalia’s military as 
they were advising Mogadishu just weeks ago before they were expelled) and sophisticated 
weaponry; technology coming to the rescue of Ethiopia, Somali stood no chance of winning 
the war (Tereke, 2000). 
In March 1978, Mogadishu announced unilateral withdrawal of its troops after having suffered 
heavy casualties (Hoehne, 2012; Tereke, 2000). Its already dilapidated economy was further 
left in shambles. The political costs and ensuing internal fissures were even greater. The defeat 
was a huge blow to the long held nationalistic sentiments which had been employed to mobilize 
popular support for the regime. The war’s setback damaged the leadership’s credibility as 
capable of uniting the Somali Peninsula. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, a group of 
military officers who returned from the Ogaden conflict staged a coup, which failed (Hoehne, 
2011). The bungled coup “set a precedent for attempts by other Somali groups to challenge the 
regime” (Elmi and Barise, 2006: 35). Therefore, the resulting unstable political configuration 
prompted internal tensions and the rise of open and underground rebellions whose objectives 
were to oust the military regime (Simons, 2012).  
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The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) was the first armed opposition to be formed 
in 1978. SSDF drew its members mainly from the Majeerteen clan in North Eastern Somalia 
(now Puntland) and its leader (a Majeerteen himself) was an army colonel, Abdullahi Yussuf, 
who was one of the Somali commanders in the Ogaden war. Soon after, in 1981, the Isaaq clan 
from the North Western Somalia (Somaliland) announced the formation of another opposition 
group Somali National Movement (SNM). The regime responded with the brutal crackdown 
of members of the clans from these opposition groups (Wam and Sardesai, 2005). The 
population of the entire regions where the leaders of the revolt hailed from were either detained, 
tortured, or even killed; and their properties looted or destroyed (Elmi and Barise, 2006; 
Hoehne, 2011). The regime’s persecution of any opposition coupled with pervasive poverty 
and unemployment, activated the proliferation of more clan based armed movements in the 
other parts of the country (Ibid). Ultimately, the military regime which ruled Somalia for 21 
years came to its knees in January 1991 as law and order gave way to complete chaos.  
 
     4.2. Perpetuating Factors 
 
          4.2.1. Cold war legacy 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the end of cold coincided with a sharp increase in the number 
of intrastate wars, particularly, in Africa (Regan, 2000). Somalia was one of those countries 
that descended into a protracted violent conflict after the fall of the Berlin war. Like numerous 
other new African states, Somalia had, after gaining independence, fallen under the sphere of 
influence of the existing bipolar systems of the capitalist West and communist bloc division. 
Due its geopolitically strategic position in the horn of Africa, Somalia has served as a 
battleground in which cold war proxy geopolitics contestation has unfolded for nearly three 
decades (Erikson, 2013; Menkhaus, 2014; Mulugeta, 2009).  
Upon independence, the young state’s foreign policy was guided by its irredentist ambition as 
mentioned elsewhere in this chapter. This ambition found accommodation, first, in the 1960s 
and 1970s from the Soviet Union in terms of substantial military and financial aid as well 
training of its armed forces. The Soviet Union’s massive military support made Somalia, within 
a few years, one of heaviest militarized state on the African continent (Brons, 2001; Osman, 
2007). The USA was, at the time, supporting Somalia’s arch-rival, Ethiopia. When Somalia 
severed its ties with USSR during the Ogaden war in 1978 because of the latter’s support for 
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the socialist regime of Ethiopia, Somalia was willingly embraced by the USA and the West 
(Hoehne, 2011). Again foreign aid (both military, financial and technical) started to flow. The 
impact of the cold war power competition on Somalia’s state formation trajectory was both 
immediate as well as enduring. Its negative ramifications has left a damaging legacy that 
persists to this day.  
To begin with, the massive military aid which Somalia received, in the early years, from USSR 
emboldened it to pursue the unification of ‘Greater Somalia’ militarily. This has resulted in the 
bloodiest interstate war the continent has ever witnessed; second to only the Ethiopian-Eritrea 
conflict in 1998-2000 (Tereke, 2000). Similarly, the Ogaden conflict has led to severe 
economic stagnation and internal fissures that weakened the state’s capacity to govern 
ultimately leading to its collapse.  Further to that, Somalia became heavily dependent on 
foreign assistance such that, for decades, the flow of foreign aid by the competing superpowers 
sustained the regime which utilized force to impose law and order as well as to assert legitimacy 
(Mulugeta, 2009; Wam and Sardesai, 2005). The aid donors overlooked the state’s excesses 
simply to pursue their strategic interests and maintain good relations with the government 
(Menkhaus, 2014). As the dependency increased the state abandoned its obligation to provide 
basic services to its citizens (Simons, 2012).  According to Menkhaus (2014: 156), “the Somali 
state in that form was, in retrospect, a castle built on sand, destined to collapse once foreign aid 
dried up, as it did in the late 1980s with the end of the Cold War”. Finally, the military stockpile 
of weapons provided by the superpowers during the cold war ended up in the possession of 
rebel groups and civilians (Elmi and Barisse, 2006). This had the impact of intensifying the 
conflict and increasing the casualties.  
 
          4.2.2. Politicized clan identity 
 
Ethnic division has often been evoked as one of the underlying causes and aggravating factors 
of civil wars in Africa and elsewhere. While, on the one hand, the primodialists argue that it is 
the inherent divisive nature of ethnicity that cause tensions, the instrumentalists, on the other 
hand, regard the manipulation of ethnic differences as the problem and not ethnicity in itself 
(Afa’anwi, 2016). The primordial-instrumental dichotomy debate exists also in the analysis of 
Somali conflict.  
37 
   
As I have outlined in chapter 3, the Somalis are divided along clans, which further branch into 
sub-clans. These divisions has been key in the socio-economic and political organizations of 
traditional Somali society. Sometimes clans have fought over resources such as pasture, 
animals and water in pre-colonial periods. However, colonialism has strengthened the existing 
divisions as they sought to ‘divide and rule’. Similarly, the Somali political elite have, over the 
years, further deepened clan cleavages through corruption, nepotism, cronyism and political 
patronage (Mulugeta, 2009; Osman, 2007). Moreover, opposition armed groups who ousted 
the military regime were mobilized by one time regime members along clan lines. After the 
collapse of the central authority, the violence that ensued mainly over resources were executed 
in the name of clans (Elmi and Barise, 2006). In this respect, it is not clan identity per se but 
clannism (i.e. the politicization and exploitation of clan identities) that has played a leading 
causal as well as perpetuating role in the civil war (Wam and Sardesa, 2005).       
 
          4.2.3. War economy 
 
Evidence from the literature on the political economy of conflicts suggests that there is a mutual 
link between the continuation of a conflict and the economy i.e. existence of a war economy 
has the impact of fuelling and prolonging a conflict (Menkhaus, 2003; Grosse-Kettler, 2004). 
In this respect, when a conflict erupts in a country such as Somalia, “identifiable groups who 
do well out of war” such as “opportunistic businessmen, criminals, traders and rebel 
organizations” will emerge (Collier, 2000: 103-4). These groups institute beneficial systems 
whose objectives are not to end the violence but rather to perpetuate it (Keen, 2000 in Grosse-
Kettler, 2004). In the Somali context, there have been myriad of individuals and groups at 
different stages of the conflict whose interests were better catered for in the war economy 
setting. They include all the above identifiable groups that collier mentions and according to 
Menkhaus (2003), the war economy theory is applicable in explaining, at least partly, the 
protracted nature of the conflict.  
 When the central authority in Somalia fell in 1991, a power vacuum was created. Taking 
advantage of the ensuing lawlessness, erstwhile regime officials and others transformed into 
warlords. Unlike elsewhere in the continent where the existence of natural resources (e.g. gold, 
diamonds and coltan) play a significant role in the conflict, Somalia lacks such resources. As a 
result, the warlords and their marauding militiamen engaged in illicit activities to benefit from 
the conflict (Grosse-Kettler, 2004). Pillaging and looting of both private and public properties 
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financed the warlords, their militias as well as their clan financiers (Menkhaus, 2003). 
Moreover, kidnappings and extortions targeted at workers of aid agencies (both local and 
international); local suspected with the means to pay ransom and minority groups as well as 
diversion of emergency assistance have become lucrative ways of profiting from the war 
economy (Ibid). Furthermore, faction leaders often heavily clashed over the control of income 
generating infrastructure, such as harbours, airports, markets, bridges or road junctions that can 
be taxed” (United Nations, 2003 quoted in Grosse-Kettler, 2004: 15). Additionally, illegal 
‘taxation’ of the banana, charcoal and qat business as well as remittances from the diaspora 
have been pointed as other activities that have fuelled the war economy (Grosse-Kettler, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
   
                                         Chapter Five 
 
5.0. Regional and International Response to the Somali Debacle 
 
     5.1. Introduction 
 
 
In January 1991, when the seat of the central authority, Mogadishu, fell into the hands of the 
armed opposition total anarchy and violence engulfed the capital. Heavy violence broke out 
between militiamen loyal to the two leading figures of the United Somali Congress (USC) 
whose forces captured the capital following leadership dispute. One faction of the opposition 
installed A.M. Mohamed as the interim president of Somalia. The other group led by General 
M.F. Aideed opposed Mr. Mohamed’s election (Johnson, 2009). The USC splintered into two 
camps. The warfare between the victors over the presidency brought heavy loss of lives and 
devastation of much of Mogadishu. As the violence intensified and spread to the much of the 
South of the country, it created massive displacement of people internally and an exodus of 
refugees across the borders (Menkhaus, 2007). Moreover, as the war raged on, marauding 
armed gangs as well as clan based militias killed, raped, looted and destroyed villages and 
crops. This aggravated a region wide impending drought eventually leading to a devastating 
man made famine that claimed the lives of an estimated 300,000 people and affected several 
million more (Ahmed and Green, 1999; Kapteijns, 2013). 
 
While this catastrophic humanitarian emergency was unfolding in Somalia, there was no 
response from the international community. Somalia has lost its cold war strategic value and 
the world’s attention was focused on the ongoing first Gulf War. Regional efforts, led by 
Djibouti and Egypt to reconcile the warring factions failed to work (Menkhaus, 2007; Johnson, 
2009). Finally, media reports containing disturbing pictures of starving children caught the 
world’s attention-the so-called ‘CNN effect’.  This prompted the UN and US to, first, airlift 
emergency relief to the starving Somalis in an operation dubbed as ‘Operation Provide Food’. 
Then, a contingent of UN peacekeepers i.e. UNSOM I was dispatched; UNSOM I was followed 
by ‘Operation Restore Hope’ or Unified Task Force (UNITAF); and finally, UNITAF was 
replaced with UNSOM II which remained in Somalia until 1995 (Kapteijns, 2013). The UN/US 
involvement in Somalia which lasted between 1992 and 1995 will be briefly explored in this 
section. 
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     5.2. UN Humanitarian Military Intervention (1992-5) 
 
 
In response to the humanitarian emergency, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
passed resolution 733-the first of a series of resolutions on Somalia. The Council imposed a 
total arms embargo on Somalia; called on the UN and other humanitarian organizations to 
hasten the delivery of humanitarian assistance; urged the warring parties to cease hostilities 
and reconcile and allow aid workers to safely distribute relief emergency (UNSCR 733, 1992). 
Moreover, the UN launched a diplomatic offensive which culminated in a cease fire agreement 
between the two main antagonists in Mogadishu. The UN’s diplomatic engagement also paved 
the way for the UNSC’s adoption of resolution 751 in April 1992 which mandated the 
establishment of UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UNSOM consisted of a small 
contingent of 50 unarmed observers and a few hundred light-armed UN personnel. Under the 
leadership of Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), UNSOM was tasked with the protection of UN staffs, safe delivery of aid, 
monitoring of the cease fire and reconciliation. On August, the Mission’s mandate and size 
were enlarged to include protection of aid convoys and distribution points in the entire country 
(Malito, 2011; Menkhaus et.al, 2009). 
 
Meanwhile, Mr. Sahnoun, a very experienced diplomat who understood the Somali culture 
very well, commenced grassroots mediation efforts that were all-inclusive. Nonetheless, his 
pragmatic approach was not in line with the UN’s view of the crisis. In October 1992, he was 
dismissed after decrying the UN’s rigid and sluggish bureaucracy (Menkhaus et.al, 2009; 
Simons, 2012). Ambassador Sahnoun’s departure is viewed as a critical moment that has set 
up the mission and Somali for failure. Mr. Sahnoun’s replacement, Ismat Kittani, lacked his 
predecessor's flexibility, independence, and understanding of the local politics and culture. He 
was accused of being a rigid individual who based his decisions on orders from UN 
headquarters rather than the reality on the ground (Roba, 2012). Soon, UNSOM I became 
ineffective. The cease-fire it was supposed to monitor was broken and the looting of 
humanitarian aid continued. It lacked the necessary resources, personnel and mandate to 
conduct peacekeeping mission in a complex and hostile environment like Somalia. 
 
Upon the failure of UNOSOM I, the Security Council passed (another) Resolution 794 on 3 
December 1992, which allowed the US to lead a multi-national Unified Task Force (UNITAF). 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNITAF was authorized to employ ‘all the necessary 
means to ascertain the speedy and safe delivery of humanitarian operations (Kapteijns, 2013; 
41 
   
Voorhoeve, 2007). Shortly after, the first patch of the UNITAF forces landed in Somalia, in 
what was dubbed as ‘Operation Restore Hope’. UNITAF’s nearly 39000 forces of which 28000 
were American improved the humanitarian security environment, saved many starving people 
and undertook a number of important reconstruction projects (Ibid). Moreover, in March 1993, 
the UN sponsored a reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia among 15 armed 
faction leaders. The factions signed an Accord in which they agreed to establish Transitional 
National Council and political structures (Menkhaus et.al, 2009).  
 
Nonetheless, UNITAF is accused of focusing on the capital, Mogadishu, and its two main 
warlords at the expense of the regionalization strategy introduced by its predecessor, UNSOM 
I. Therefore, Kapteijns (2013) argues that ‘waltzing with the warlords’, particularly General 
M.F. Aideed, gave them recognition and legitimacy as interlocutors of the Somali people 
(Kapteijns, 2013: 247).  Similarly, the critical mistake of inviting only armed faction leaders 
(15 of them) as representatives of the people tilted the balance of power towards the warlords 
vis-à-vis existing alternatives of authority e.g. traditional and religious leaders; the youth; 
women and other civil society leaders (Menkhaus et.al, 2009). Furthermore, UNITAF with its 
massive force and resources did not conduct disarmament activities as it treated the mission as 
purely a humanitarian issue.   
 
With UNITAF declaring mission accomplished, after three months, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 814 on 20 March 1993. The Resolution replaced UNITAF with UNSOM II. 
UNISOM II was given more ambitious and broader political mandate of disarmament; mine 
clearing; economic reconstruction; repatriation of IDPs and refugees; maintaining peace, law 
and order; national reconciliation; and re-establishment of national political institutions 
(Voorhoeve, 2007; Kapteijns, 2013; Menkhaus et.al, 2009). However, UNSOM’s attempts to 
carry out these mandates was met with strong opposition from the armed factions, particularly 
those led by General Aideed. For instance, disagreements soon transpired over the 
implementation of the Addis Ababa Accord. While the UN intended the process of establishing 
local governance structures to be broad based, consultative and inclusive grassroots exercise, 
the faction leaders wanted to spearhead the selection of local and district councils as they saw 
themselves as the legitimate representatives of the people (Menkhaus et.al, 2009).  
 
Moreover, the mission’s endeavour to disarm General Aideed turned violent leading to the 
killing of 24 UN peacekeepers in one day. Infuriated by this act, UNSOM commanders ordered 
a hunt for Aideed and placed a $25,000 bounty on his head. Eventually, the hunt for Aideed 
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culminated in what is dubbed as ‘Battle of Mogadishu’ or ‘Black Hawk Down’ where, on 
October 1993, a bloody violence between UN troops and Aideed’s militiamen resulted in the 
killing of 18 American marines and hundreds of Somalis, many of them civilians (Brons, 2001; 
Simons, 2012; Mulugeta, 2009). Soon after the US began withdrawing its troops out of Somalia 
and on March 1994, final batch were airlifted. One year later, UNSOM II ended its mission in 
Somalia without any achievement on the political and security front.  
 
In a nutshell, while few dispute that the humanitarian efforts of the UN saved many lives, the 
mission failed to end the conflict and establish a functioning political order. In fact, some 
analysts argue that the intervention had worsened the situation by fuelling the war economy; 
‘waltzing with the warlords’ and unintentionally marginalizing alternative authorities; 
engaging in human rights violation and collateral damages that further alienated the citizens 
(Møller, 2009; Grosse-Kettler, 2004; Kapteijns, 2013).  
 
 
     5.3 POST-UN Interventions 
 
          5.3.1. Regional Diplomacy: Top-down Peacebuilding & State-building 
 
 
The disastrous end of the UN mission in Somalia led to a strong disinclination on the part of 
the international community, particularly the US and the UN, to re-engage in Somalia. The 
onus of resolving the Somali crisis fell on the shoulders of neighbouring states in the region 
whose national security and economic interests were directly or indirectly threatened by 
continued lawlessness. Regional bodies and governments have engaged in several, albeit futile, 
efforts to reconstitute a functioning state for Somalia. No less than a dozen such attempts were 
made at finding a political settlement to the conflict (Mulugeta 2009, Walls, 2009; Pham, 
2013). Generally motivated by geopolitical and economic considerations, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, and Yemen have made periodic efforts to broker agreements between the opposing sides 
to the conflict. In some cases, competition between regional rivals (specifically between 
Ethiopia and Egypt) led to sponsoring of rival factions in order to derail the other’s efforts 
(Menkhaus et.al, 2009). As a result, all the regional endeavours undertaken in the immediate 
aftermath of UN’s withdrawal did not amount to anything significant. 
 
Meanwhile, the continued absence of a central government and the withdrawal of the UN 
peacekeepers did not, as some dreaded, lead to the degeneration and intensification of the 
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conflict. While the violence did not end, its nature, duration, and intensity have notably 
changed. It became intermittent, more localized, briefer and less potent as each faction or clan 
consolidated their gains or defended their turf (Wam and Sardesai, 2005; Menkhaus et.al, 
2009). Local informal governance structures, which differed in their efficacy, emerged at the 
municipal, district, regional and trans-regional levels. While some flourished and endured to 
become either self-declared independent polity (e.g. Somaliland) or semi-autonomous regional 
entity (e.g. Puntland), others did not. In this respect, the absence of a formal government did 
not translate into a lack of governance; rather there was ‘governance without government’ 
(Menkhaus, 2006).  
 
          5.3.2. The Transitional National Government (TNG) 
 
 
At this juncture, once again, the small country of Djibouti convened a reconciliation conference 
for Somalia in May 2000. The Arta Peace Process, as it was called, was uniquely different from 
past mediation efforts held for Somalia. It was more consultative and representative. It brought 
together a wide spectrum of stakeholders including traditional, religious and business leaders; 
intellectuals; women and youth; and the diaspora. Moreover, it adopted clan based power 
sharing formula known as ‘the 4.5 formula’. The system allows equal number of seats among 
the four main clans and allocates a half that number to a collection of minority clans 
(Menkhaus, 2003). In August 2000, the process concluded with the establishment of a 
Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG received external recognition from the 
UN, some Gulf state countries, and Egypt as well as some initial local support.  
However, the TNG soon faced fierce opposition internally and externally. Internally, 
Somaliland, Puntland and a number of warlords in the South refused to recognize it. Externally, 
Ethiopia became suspicious of the TNG’s close relationship with her regional rival, Egypt as 
well as the influence of some Islamists within the TNG (Wam and Sardesai, 2005; Menkhaus, 
2007). Therefore, with the support of Ethiopia, internal factions opposed to the TNG created 
an alliance called the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) (Farah, et. Al, 
2012; ICG, 2007 in Mulugeta, 2009). These challenges compounded with internal squabbling, 
corruption and lack of resources made the TNG ineffective and gradually irrelevant as a 
national government. When it became apparent that the TNG was a done deal, the search for 
its replacement began in earnest long before its three-year mandate was over. Specifically, in 
44 
   
post-September 2001 context, the Somali crisis has received renewed interest from the US 
where failed states were seen as safe havens for terrorism.  
 
          5.3.3. The War on Terror and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
 
 
So, in October 2002, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with the 
financial backing of US and EU sponsored a peace process convened in Kenya. The Mbagathi 
Peace Process, as this was the name given to the process because of the location it was held, 
lasted for nearly two years. After lengthy and protracted rounds of negotiations dogged by 
claims of corruption and interferences from regional powers, there was a breakthrough in 
October 2004. The delegates passed a Transitional Federal Charter and selected 275 members 
of parliaments who in turn elected Abdullahi Yussuf, a former pro-Ethiopian warlord as 
president. The president appointed a prime minister who also constituted cabinet ministers 
shortly (Bruton and Williams, 2014). Hence, out of the Mbagathi process, the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) was born. However, the TFG was dominated by the Ethiopian 
leaning SRRC Warlord coalition. This raised questions about the credibility and legitimacy of 
the entire process and outcome. 
 
Many people viewed the TFG as a client administration for Ethiopia which is anti-Islamist and 
pro-federalist (Ibid; Menkhaus, 2007).  Like its predecessor, the TNG, the TFG was rejected 
by a strong opposition alliance mainly from the capital. Moreover, the TFG’s leadership 
proposal for the deployment of regional peacekeepers including Ethiopians angered many 
Somalis including some of its members causing it to split into two camps. For a while the TFG 
remained in exile and when it finally moved to Somalia, it could not relocate to the capital, 
Mogadishu, for security reasons (Menkhaus, 2007). By early 2006, the TFG existed just but in 
name. Its authority was limited to a small town outside Mogadishu where it was temporarily 
located under the protection of Ethiopian forces. 
  
          5.3.4. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) 
 
 
In 2006, due to a confluence of both external and internal influences, the dynamics of the 
Somali crisis witnessed dramatic and confounding episodes, which pushed the country into 
new levels chaos and sufferings. The plunge into the renewed anarchy was precipitated by the 
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US counter terrorism campaigns in Somalia which by-passed the weak TFG and sought to 
partner with powerful warlords in the capital. The result was creation of an Alliance for 
Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) in February 2006. The CIA funded the 
ARPCT in order to combat radicalism and capture foreign Al-Qaeda operatives believed to be 
hiding in Somalia (Kasaija, 2010; Guglielmo, 2011). The announcement of the ARPCT and its 
connection with the CIA triggered popular uprising in Mogadishu by a coalition of Islamic 
Courts, known as Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) backed by businessmen. Soon violent clashes 
ensued between the ARPCT and UIC, which culminated into the defeat of the ARPCT in June 
2006. The UIC quickly established its authority and rule over much of South and central 
Somalia (Kasaija, 2010). For the first time in many years, the UIC brought back safety and 
security; removed roadblocks; reopened the ports and airports for business; and improved 
quality of life for ordinary people (Pham, 2013; Kasaija, 2010). As a result, it received high 
level of popularity among the war weary population and many fondly referred to this period as 
the golden six months of peace. 
 
          5.3.5. Ethiopian Invasion and Rise of Al-Shabaab 
 
 
The rapid expansion of the UIC endangered the survival of the internationally recognized but 
weak TFG which was still provisionally based in Baidoa town. Moreover, the abrupt rise of 
the Islamists agitated the US and its regional ally, Ethiopia who feared the emergence of an 
Islamic State in Somalia. Furthermore, call for attacks on Ethiopia by some extremist elements 
in the midst of the Islamists and Eritrea’s support to the CIU prompted Ethiopia to intervene 
militarily in Somalia in late December 2006 with the tacit encouragement of America (Kasaija, 
2010; Guglielmo, 2011). In a matter of days, the Ethiopian forces trounced the CIU and helped 
the TFG to occupy the capital. However, Ethiopia’s offensive initiated insurgency from a core 
radical group within the defeated CIU referred to us Al-Shabaab, thereby introducing 
radicalism into the Somali conflict. Moreover, the subsequent violence during Ethiopia’s two-
year occupation resulted in extraordinary loss of life, destruction, displacement and 
humanitarian emergency. This in turn increased anti-Ethiopian nationalist sentiments that 
increased support for Al-Shabaab both locally and in the diaspora (Menkhaus, 2011). 
 
In the meantime, the leaders of the CIU fled the country and regrouped in Asmara, Eritrea, 
where they formed anti-Ethiopian occupation coalition called the Alliance for the Re-liberation 
of Somalia (ARS) in September 2007 (Guglielmo, 2011). In the face of unrelenting insurgency 
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with unsustainably heavy human and financial cost for Ethiopia, it was apparent that there 
would be no military answer to the Somali crisis. Therefore, the UN and others acknowledged 
that the only way to resolve the crisis (of Islamic militancy and radicalism) was through a peace 
process encompassing the ‘moderate’ Islamists in a power sharing arrangement (ICG, 2008 
quoted in Kasaija, 2008: 270). After several months of UN-led negotiations held in Djibouti 
between the ARS and the TFG, a deal was reached. The deal entailed the withdrawal of 
Ethiopian forces; the deployment of international peacekeepers; cease-fire; power sharing and 
so on (Bruton and Williams, 2014). In January 2009, the Djibouti peace process culminated in 
the formation of a government of national unity led by former CIU chairman Sharif Sh. Ahmed. 
The Ethiopian troops began to withdraw too as the first contingent of AU mission peacekeepers 
(AMISOM) arrived to replace them. These developments were expected to knock the wind out 
of the insurgent militancy’s sails.  
 
On the contrary, Al-Shabaab moved swiftly to take over territories vacated by the Ethiopians 
including a big portion of the capital. The new TFG was restricted to a few square kilometres 
near Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, and the road connecting it to the airport under the 
protection of AMISOM. The militant group became the de facto authority in the majority of 
South and central Somalia and remained so up until 2011 (Menkhaus, 2011; Bruton and 
Williams, 2014). AMISOM and TFG forces faced daily attacks from Al-Shabaab. The major 
reason being the lack of capacity, means and resources on the part of AMISOM forces and the 
TFG troops to fight Al-Shabaab. By 2010, only over a half of the mandated 8,000 AMISOM 
peacekeepers were deployed to Somalia owing to issues pertaining to lack of funding and 
interest to send troops to Somalia. The TFG relied on militias who were controlled by 
government friendly commanders or warlords; they were divided along clan lines; they were 
not well trained; and were not paid or poorly paid (Bruton and Williams, 2014). 
 
However, due to a surge in the number of its forces, AMISOM managed to drive Al-Shabaab 
out of Mogadishu in early 2011. Moreover, regional security concerns following Al-Shabaab’s 
attack in Kampala, Uganda, which killed 74 people as well as other similar attacks and 
kidnappings in Kenya triggered neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia to conduct coordinated 
offensive in the fall of the 2011. From then on, AMISOM together with the Kenyan and 
Ethiopian troops have managed to liberate many urban centres and territories from Al-Shabaab 
(Anderson, 2014). This allowed for political space in which Somalia’s international partners 
could further undertake state-building project. In September 2012, Somalia ended its long 
period of Transitional Governments and ushered in a permanent government. More 
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importantly, it was the first time a government was instituted inside the country. At the 
moment, AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) control nearly all the major towns 
in the South and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab has a permanent presence only in a few towns, 
but they also control large swathes of territories in the villages. This loss of territories have 
denied the group vital sources of income. Moreover, over the years, the group has suffered 
many casualties on the battlefield and some of its foreign and local commanders including its 
ruthless and elusive leader, Ahmed Godane, have been taken down by US drone strikes 
(Anderson, 2016). 
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned setbacks, today Al-Shabaab remains the most singular 
threat to the Somali government as well as to the peace and security in the larger region. The 
group has maintained its operational capacity and fighting capability. It has carried out 
spectacularly complex raids on several important and high profile targets both inside and 
outside Somalia, including highly fortified AMISOM and Somali army bases with high 
casualties (Anderson, 2014). Actually, in 2016, the group has been crowned, according to 
figures recorded by Africa Center for Strategic Study, as the deadliest terror group in the world, 
overtaking Boko Haram and Islamic State or Daesh (Gaffey, 2017).  
 
Today, while it is undeniable that Somalia is making slow progress towards statehood and 
security is improving slightly thanks to over 22,000 strong AMISOM forces, the country still 
remains fragile by any standards. It remains one of the most dangerous and impoverished 
countries in the world. Somalia is territorially and politically fragmented too. The 
implementation of the federal system of governance, which was completed last year, has 
divided the South and central Somalia in four administrative regions known as federal regional 
states: Jubaland, South West state, Galmudug and Hirshabelle. Apart from these four, there 
are also Somaliland, Puntland and another contested one called Khaatumo state in the northern 
regions. Somaliland has since 1991 declared independence and does not want to be part of a 
future Somalia state, although it remains internationally unrecognized. All these federal states 
have their own presidents, cabinet ministers, parliament and flags. The constitution is still 
provisional and needs to be completed and ratified in a referendum; there are no clear laws that 
govern the relationship between the federal government and member states, for example, how 
resources should be shared. There are strong criticisms about how the federalism project is 
promoting clan division since it is largely based on along clan lines (see the map in appendix 
3).        
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                                                Chapter Six 
 
6.0. The Emergence of Other Somalia(s): The Case of Somaliland and Puntland 
                                                                                       
Somalia is virtually a laboratory test case, with the south 
acting as a control group against the experiment in the 
north. We have (…) the same people coming out of the 
same [crisis], resulting from the collapse of the same 
state, yet you see completely different results… (David 
Kilcullen quoted in Pham, 2013: 37).  
     6.1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the central government in Somalia, not all regions in the 
country have been affected or continued to be affected in the same way. While the situation in 
the South and central of the country have continued to be defined by the unrelenting crisis 
detailed in the preceding chapters, the Northern regions have largely escaped the fate that had 
befallen their brethren. In the Northwest, Somaliland has declared independence in 1991 and 
has ever since blossomed, incrementally, into a relatively stable, functioning democracy though 
it remains internationally unrecognized (Pham, 2013). The self-declared republic of 
Somaliland is located in the Northwest part of the seven shaped figure of the (former) republic 
of Somalia. It borders Djibouti and Ethiopia to the North and West respectively; and regional 
state of Puntland to the East (Walls and Kibble, 2010). 
Similarly, in the Northeast, the regional state of Puntland has since its formation in 1998 as an 
autonomous state, that wish to be part of a unified federal Somali state, maintained internal 
stability and made progress in self-governance. Remarkably, the societies in both cases have 
organized themselves with little outside assistance and employed traditional clan based state-
building mechanisms to create effective political and administrative structures that meet their 
needs (Johnson and Smaker, 2014; Pham, 2013)   
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     6.2. Somaliland: Background 
 
As I have alluded to elsewhere, the republic of Somalia came into existence in July 1, 1960 
after the former British Somaliland Protectorate, in the North, and the Italian colony, in the 
South, obtained their independence from Britain and Italy respectively and voluntarily merged. 
The former was the first to gain independence on June 26, 1960. Therefore, for a period of five 
days, Somaliland existed as a sovereign state recognized by the UN. Immediately after the 
merger, however, the unification euphoria gave way to disillusionment as people from the 
North felt politically disenfranchised. Soon, there were controversies about the legality of the 
union especially after the majority of Northerners rejected the union in a referendum the 
following year (Farrell, 2012; Pham, 2012).  
Subsequent events in the following decades including, but not limited to, the failure to realize 
the ‘Greater Somalia’ dream; centralization of power in Mogadishu; systematic discrimination 
and repression of the military regime made the Northerners to feel increasingly frustrated and 
alienated. As a result, in 1981, a group of political elite in the diaspora belonging to the most 
dominant Isaaq clan in the North formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in London. 
SNM declared its objective as the ouster of the military regime and replacing it with a more 
inclusive democratic system; ultimately leading to a civil war and the fall of the military regime 
after a decade of insurgency (Renders and Terlinden, 2010;Eubank, 2011; Pham, 2012).   
In 1982, due to continued suppression and economic deprivation of the Isaaq people, SNM 
relocated its activities to Ethiopia after the Ethiopian government offered them operational 
basis. From across the Ethiopian border, the liberation movement launched small-scale armed 
guerrilla campaign against military targets inside Somalia. In 1988, SNM fighters attacked and 
took control of Hargeisa and Burco, the two largest cities in the North. Expectedly, the military 
regime responded with indiscriminate shelling and heavy bombardments of those towns killing 
more than 50,000 civilians; causing substantial destruction of infrastructure; displacement of 
hundreds of thousands internally and across the Ethiopian border (Africa Watch, 1990 in 
Renders and Terlinden, 2010; Walls, 2009; Pijović, 2013; Kaplan, 2008). Moreover, the 
military regime troops unleashed widespread abuses such as extrajudicial killings, detentions 
and torture against the civilian population (Arieff, 2008). Other opposition armed groups 
emerged in the Southern regions of the country. SNM allied itself with those groups, 
specifically the United Somali Congress (USC) whose militias were concurrently fighting the 
government forces in the capital, Mogadishu, and its environs. Eventually, SNM managed to 
50 
   
drive government troops out of the major towns in the North as the USC succeeded to force 
President Siad Barre out of Mogadishu in January 1991 (Pijović, 2013). 
The defeat of the military regime brought utterly two contrasting outcomes for the South and 
the North of the country. Whilst the former descended into complete lawlessness and utter 
chaos, the latter managed to avert large-scale political mayhem and civil unrest that engulfed 
their brethren in the South. The victorious Isaaq-led SNM, with the help traditional leaders, 
reached out to the non-Isaaq clans in the North including pro-regime factions who opposed 
them rather than engaging in retaliatory attacks (Pham, 2013). Through strings of localised 
mediation and reconciliation meetings between SNM commanders and traditional elders of 
different clans and sub-clans, Northerners were able to begin a process of repairing damaged 
relations among communities. Following this, in February 1991, representatives from all the 
Northern clans held the first national peace conference in the town of Berbara. Here, the 
delegation announced a formal cease-fire; SNM agreed to release prisoners of war; and a 
follow-up national conference was scheduled in April to be held in the town of Burco (Walls, 
Ali and Mohamed, 2008).  
 
          6.2.1. Burco Conference 
 
For three weeks, beginning from April 27, 1991, traditional elders from the Northern territories 
together with other key stakeholders (i.e. civic leaders) convened in the war ravaged city of 
Burco for a national conference dubbed as ‘The Grand Conference of Northern Clans’. The 
conference was envisioned to carry on with the initial process of inter clan confidence building 
and to chart a political future for region. By the conclusion of the conference, the delegation 
passed several resolutions, the most historic being the declaration of independence (Walls et. 
Al., 2008). This was a critical juncture in the post-collapse history of Somaliland as well as 
Somalia. The severing of ties from the rest of Somalia meant revocation of the Act of Union 
which merged the two former colonies upon gaining their independence three decades ago in 
1960. Secession was neither a policy of the SNM nor an agenda of a meeting, which its Central 
Committee was concurrently holding alongside that of the traditional elders and other civic 
leaders. The decision was an extemporaneous reaction informed by the collective experience 
of years of marginalization exacerbated by the fresh memory of persecution suffered under the 
military regime. Moreover, the continued chaos in the South and the unilateral declaration of a 
government in Mogadishu by USC without consulting SNM rekindled memories of Southern 
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domination. Consequently, the SNM leadership conceded to the popular demands to secede 
(Bradbury et. al, 2003; Hoehne, 2009; 2011). 
In addition, the conference participants produced a provisional National Charter, which 
authorized SNM to form an interim authority to run the newly established republic of 
Somaliland. Moreover, the government was assigned to draft a constitution and prepare the 
country for elections within its mandated two-year period (Bradbury et. al, 2003). The new 
government was centred around the movement’s power structure, with chairman Abdirahman 
Ali ‘Tuur’ assuming the presidency and its decision making Central Committee taking up the 
role of legislators or executives although some non-SNM ( meaning non-Isaaq) members were 
given some ministerial post for inclusivity (Ibid). Declaring independence and cobbling 
together an administration was one thing but establishing an effective authority over a territory 
destroyed by conflict with no financial capacity or international assistance would prove a 
daunting challenge for the nascent administration.  
Soon long-standing fissures among the Isaaq sub-clans within the movement, which was 
suppressed due to the existence of a common regime enemy, came to the surface and exploded 
into open confrontation in Burco in late 1991. Subsequently, again in March 1992, heavier 
fighting erupted between the government and clan militias over the control of Berbara port, 
which the government saw as a vital source of revenue (Farah and Lewis, 1997; Bradbury et. 
al, 2003). The fighting, which continued until October 1992, threatened to drive Somaliland 
into abyss of protracted civil unrest. Fortunately, such a threat was eventually deterred thanks 
to the relentless efforts and interventions of civic leaders (e.g. women and religious leaders), 
particularly, traditional elders skilled in local conflict resolution mechanisms (xeer). Through 
a series of clan peace meetings, clan elders backed by other stakeholders in the society managed 
to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict. 
 
          6.2.2. Sheekh Conference 
 
The first peace conference was convened in the town of Sheekh. Apart from its success in 
ending the war, the conference determined that all public properties, including Berbara port, 
should be transferred in the hands of the national administration. More importantly, the 
delegates formally introduced a national council of elders (known as Guurti) into the 
governance structure of Somaliland. The Guurti are composed traditional clan elders of all the 
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clans in the territory of Somaliland. Their wide ranging responsibilities included promoting 
and safeguarding peace and security by ensuring peaceful coexistence among the communities 
(Bradbury et. al, 2003). Although the Sheekh conference did end the fighting, it did not address 
an underlying issue which was the looming succession question of the interim SNM 
administration. The interim SNM government’s mandate was due to end in May 1993 after 
which it was supposed to transfer authority to a civilian government. Thus, a follow up 
conference, to take place in the town of Borama in 1993, was scheduled for this purpose (Walls 
et. al, 2008).   
 
          6.2.3. Boorama Conference 
 
The conference in Boorama came at a critical moment when Somaliland was at a cross road in 
its endeavour towards laying the foundation of a stable state. It lasted for nearly four months 
(January-May 1993); in attendance were 150 national ‘Guurti’ members and hundreds of 
delegates from all sectors of the society including women this time (Walls et. al, 2008). The 
conference dealt with a legion of far reaching issues. For instance, the delegates drafted a 
National charter and Peace Charter which defined, respectively, institutional and governance 
structures; and peace and security. The National Charter created a hybrid system of governance, 
known as Beel or clan system, which encompassed traditional clan system and a modern 
system. In this regard, in recognition of the centrality of the clan, the function of clan elders as 
peace makers was institutionalised as part of a bicameral legislature with the formation of an 
Upper House of Elders or the House of ‘Guurti’. The inclusion of clan representatives in the 
state power structure was also meant to enhance legitimacy and act as an oversight to the 
executive. More significantly, in the Borama conference, the clan elders elected a new 
president, Mohamed Haji Igal, with a mandate to rule for three years, thus ensuring a peaceful 
handover of power to a civilian administration (Bradbury et. al, 2003).  
President Igal was a veteran politician who served as Somalia’s prime minister during the 
civilian administration in the 1960s. Many people viewed him as an experienced and capable 
politician who would make Somaliland a recognized sovereign state. Hence, riding on a wave 
of broad popular support, the nascent administration covered some significant ground in its 
first one and a half year in terms of institution building, domestic resource mobilization, 
improved security and economic revival. However, having lost the top leadership as well as 
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some key positions in the new government, members of the former president’s sub-clan 
opposed president Igal’s administration terming it as ‘illegitimate’ (Walls et. al, 2008).  
The political tussle threatened Somaliland’s secessionist agenda when an opposition delegation 
led by former president ‘Tuur’ went to Mogadishu and announced their support for a united 
federal Somalia. Moreover, the increasing tension escalated when the government attempted 
to take control of the Hargeisa airport which was controlled by the opposition clan militia. The 
resulting armed confrontation between the government and opposition militia which broke out 
in late 1994 would last until October 1996. It would require another national reconciliation 
conference held in Hargeisa to end the fighting. The two-year war, though low in intensity, had 
caused over 180,000 people to flee the towns of Burco and Hargeisa. It had also left the already 
dilapidated infrastructure and economy in shambles (Iqbal, 2007; Bradbury et. al, 2003; Walls 
et. al, 2008).  
 
          6.2.4. Hargeisa Conference 
 
Hargeisa national conference, which took place between October 1996 and February 1997, 
differed from the previous conferences in terms of number of participants, scope, 
administration and outcome. The number of delegates were more than double those of the 
Borama conference because of the inclusion of minority clans for the first time and increasing 
representation for some clans. Funding was, this time, provided by the government rather than 
the community as was the case in the preceding conferences and therefore accusation of 
government manipulation was echoed by some observers (Walls et. al 2008).  The delegates 
re-elected president Igal together with a deputy president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, for a period of 
five years. Moreover, the members of the bicameral legislature, the house of representative and 
the Upper House of elders, were elected, respectively for a five and six year term. Furthermore, 
the participants approved a provisional constitution which stipulated the transition to a 
multiparty democratic system upon its approval in a national referendum (Bradbury, 2010; 
Walls et. al, 2008). 
The Hargeisa Conference has concluded a tumultuous period of peacebuilding and state-
building in Somaliland marked by intermittent conflicts. Since then, Somaliland has not only 
shunned another conflict but has also made significant progress towards building stable 
democratic institutions. In 2001, the provisional constitution was ratified through national 
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referendum, affirming Somaliland’s status as sovereign state and ushering in a multiparty 
system of electoral politics (Eubank, 2011; Renders and Terlinden, 2010). However, in May 
2002, president Igal suddenly died while undergoing treatment in South Africa. The sudden 
death of President Igal who was seen as the architecture of the Somaliland progress presented 
a challenge for Somaliland since the deputy president was from a minority non-Isaaq clan and 
has fought alongside the deposed military regime against the people of the North (Kaplan, 
2008). However, he took over the presidency peacefully as stipulated in the constitution. Soon 
after, local elections were conducted in 2002 and within a year later the first presidential 
elections were contested in which the incumbent president, Riyale Kahin, won with a narrow 
margin of less than a 100 votes of the nearly half a million votes cast. Rather than resorting to 
violence, the opposition candidate challenged the election outcome through the constitutional 
court. This put to test the robustness of the young democracy’s institutions. (Kaplan, 2008; 
Hesse, 2010; Iqbal, 2009; Poore, 2009). The court upheld the decision of the electoral body, 
upon which the challenger accepted the verdict.  
Then, in 2005, parliamentary elections were concluded in a peaceful and orderly manner. In 
2010, presidential elections were again held. This time the incumbent lost a closely contested 
election and transferred power peacefully to the winner, Ahmed Mohamed ‘Siilaanyo’. With 
another election expected to take place soon, Somaliland has so far conducted three peaceful 
elections since the promulgation of the new constitution in 2001. Granted, the young polity 
faces numerous challenges in solidifying its democratic gains. For instance, clan dynamics still 
plays influential role in voting behaviour and members of the ‘Guurti’ Council or upper house 
who wield considerable power are not elected, hence, making them not accountable to the 
people (Walls and Kibble, 2010; Johnson and Smaker, 2014). Nevertheless, the peaceful 
elections, which international observers judged as free, and fair have transformed Somaliland 
from an ad hoc ‘beel’ or clan system of governance to a constitutionally grounded system of 
competitive multiparty electoral democracy.    
In addition, Somaliland has succeeded in conducting DDR exercises and cleared land mines; 
resettled IDPs and refugees; reconstructed the severely damaged social and economic 
infrastructure (airports, seaports, roads, hospitals and universities); created secure environment 
for private business investment to thrive and above all managed to remain an island of stability 
in a sea of chaos. Furthermore, Somaliland possesses all the markers of a sovereign state i.e. a 
national army and police force; a flag; a national anthem; a central bank and own currency; 
passport; vehicle licence plates; an international airport and a national airline (Kaplan, 2008; 
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Hesse, 2010; Walls and Kibble, 2010). Interestingly, the self-declared independent polity has 
achieved all the aforementioned successes without receiving any international recognition and 
without any bilateral or multilateral aid.  
 
     6.3. Puntland: Background  
 
The regional State of Puntland was created in August 1998 as an autonomous polity in the 
Northeast part of Somalia (Bradbury, 2010). Puntland’s successful trajectory towards self-
governance and autonomy is less complex, more straightforward than that of her neighbour in 
the West (Somaliland), though it followed comparable yet diverse model. Like Somaliland, 
traditional clan elders employing grassroots reconciliation mechanisms backed by intellectuals, 
business people, religious leaders and politicians were at the forefront in its formation. But, 
unlike Somaliland, the functions of these clan elders were not institutionalized and, therefore, 
they did not form part of the governance structure of the state. Moreover, Puntland does not 
pursue independence from Somalia; rather, it aspires to be part of a united but decentralized 
federalist Somali state (Hesse, 2010; Bryden, 1999). Unlike the Isaaq clan whose territorial 
presence is confined to the Northwest region (Somaliland), the Harti clan, particularly, the 
Majeerteen sub-clan of Darod that is dominant in Puntland have a presence beyond the 
Northeast region (Puntland). Therefore, they stand to benefit in a united federal Somalia more 
than the Isaaq of Somaliland (Hesse, 2010).  
The process of creating a regional state for the people of North-eastern Somalia did not 
commence immediately after the fall of the military regime. It took them seven years to kick-
start serious efforts towards establishing their own state. Following the power vacuum created 
by the collapse of Somalia’s government, a revived Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) 
led by its founder, colonel Abdullahi Yussuf, became the dominant military power in that 
region. SSDF was formed in 1979, after the devastating Somali-Ethiopian war, as the first 
armed rebellion against the military regime. The organization was weakened in 1985 after its 
leader, colonel Yussuf, was jailed in Ethiopia where the movement has established its 
operational basis. He was freed when the then Ethiopian regime was ousted in 1991, coinciding 
with the beginning of the Somali civil war (Hoehne, 2015; 2010). SSDF members, as a clan 
based organization, hailed from the Majeerteen clan which is the dominant group in the north 
eastern territories. Therefore, SSDF members and their leaders re-established themselves in 
this region.  
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As the war raged on, many people from the Majeerteen clan fled Mogadishu and other parts of 
Somalia to resettle the land of their forefathers causing a surge in population in towns like 
Bosasso and Garowe (Doornbos, 2002; Menkhaus, 2011). This coupled with threats from 
marauding armed gangs and USC militias necessitated SSDF leaders to address common 
communal external security threats and the local population to have interest in the 
establishment of a regional administration to offer stability, order and safety (Johnson and 
Smaker, 2014). However, the process of state formation stalled due to internal SSDF leadership 
disputes between two of the region’s most prominent political heavy weights i.e. the SSDF 
chairman, colonel Yussuf, and his long-time rival and a former police chief, General Mohamed 
Abshir (Hoehne, 2009).  
Things were to change in early 1998 when accumulated frustrations emanating from persistent 
failures of numerous reconciliation attempts to reconstitute the Somali state, the latest ones 
being two rival conferences held in Addis Ababa and Cairo in 1997 and early 1998, triggered 
series of serious deliberations to form a regional state for the residents of the north east 
territories (Doornbos, 2002; Pham, 2013).  Just like in Somaliland, clan representatives and 
civic leaders from the communities in the region held months-long deliberations which 
ultimately resulted in the ‘Garowe Declaration’ where the state of Puntland was officially born. 
Subsequently, clan elders appointed members of the polity’s parliament based on (sub) clan 
representation and adopted a provisional charter. The 66-member parliamentarians in turn 
elected colonel Yussuf, as the first president of Puntland for a transition period of three years 
during which time his administration was to deliver a new constitution (Hesse, 2010).  
When, in 2001, president Yussuf’s term in office expired and he has failed to deliver his 
primary mandate of ushering in a new constitution, clan elders replaced him with a new 
president, General Jama Ali Jama. However, president Yussuf refused to relinquish power and 
reinstalled himself forcefully back to power after defeating General Jama’s forces (Iqbal,2009; 
Hesse, 2010). His departure came only after he succeeded in getting elected to the presidency 
of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia in 2004. Since then, Puntland has 
elected, though still indirectly, three other presidents, introduced a new constitution and 
maintained stability.  
The wheel of Puntland’s democracy has not yet turned full circle in terms of multiparty 
electoral politics. The polity’s representatives in parliament and the president are still selected 
through indirect elections by their respective (sub) clan elders. Its interim charter in 1998 
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stipulated the government to prepare the entity for multiparty system of representation. Again, 
in 2009, the new constitution required an electoral body to be established and direct elections 
to be held by 2012. However, this did not happen and the current legislators and the president 
were again indirectly elected at the beginning of 2014 (Johnson and Smaker, 2014). So, nearly 
20 years after its creation and after the (indirect) elections of four different presidents, Puntland 
is yet to transit from clan-centred politics (beel system) to competitive system of direct 
multiparty elections. Johnson and Smaker, referencing an ICG 2013 report, argue that the lack 
of progress is due Puntland’s political elites’ continued engagement and participation in the 
reconciliation efforts of the larger Somalia as they have at numerous times sought to ascend to 
the presidency of Somalia or influence the direction of a future federal Somalia at the expense 
of local politics.  
Nevertheless, Puntland has succeeded in undertaking peacebuilding and state-building project 
that is only second to the Somaliland experiment in terms of its success (Pham, 2013). It has, 
by and large, managed to put in place locally negotiated political and administrative structures 
that have, so far, proven to be resilient and capable of providing basic services to their citizens 
especially in juxtaposition with the South and central part of the country.  
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                                            Chapter Seven 
 
7.0. Discussion, Summary and Analysis 
 
     7.1. Introduction 
 
Throughout this thesis, in the preceding chapters, I have at some length established, in a 
historically descriptive and explorative narrative, the most critical events that have shaped the 
current political crisis of the Somali state. In the same vein, I have discussed and explained 
(albeit passingly) the complex causal mechanisms and processes that have led to the outcome 
of interest in this case study. This chapter will further discuss, summarise and more crucially 
analyse these aforementioned critical events and causal mechanisms in a more focused, 
structured, detailed and chronological manner through the lens of the theories identified in 
chapter 2, especially, focussing on the theories of path dependency and critical junctures.  To 
better execute this goal, I will divide the process into three historical periods. The point of 
departure will be colonialism and colonial rule, which had set in motion subsequent causal 
mechanisms that would create path dependent processes. Then, I will analyse the Somali post-
colonial statehood experiment and how it has not only replicated and reinforced inherited 
colonial practices but also added new layers of causes or problems that would set the stage for 
subsequent events. Finally, I will assess events in the post-collapse Somali state and their 
impacts on the outcome. Within every period, I will identify critical junctures and demonstrate 
how they have causally contributed to the overall situation.  
To briefly recap, before diving into the assessment of the case study, the concept of path 
dependency is applied both in a general and in a narrow version. According to Pierson (2000), 
the general definition pertains to “the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal 
sequence (pg. 252). In other words, "what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the 
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time." (Sewell, 1996: 
262-3 quoted in Pierson, 2000: 252). The narrower definition entails both a “self-reinforcing 
and reactive sequence” of events. The self-reinforcing sequence postulates that initial steps 
towards a certain course of action has a self-reinforcing effect i.e. increasing returns. In the 
reactive sequence, sets of events are causally linked and temporally ordered such that each 
incident is the causal chain is part of a reaction to prior incidents. Hence, the final event in the 
chain is normally the outcome of interest for the investigator (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). 
This thesis will adopt a combination of all the above definitions. However, while the path 
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dependence will be helpful in illuminating how history matters or how an initial event either 
will produce a self-reinforcing sequence of events or will lead to a reactive process, it is actually 
the process of tracing or locating critical junctures within the path dependency framework that 
will offer this study its analytical and explanatory power.   
 
     7.2. Colonial Rule: Setting the stage in motion 
 
 
An analysis of Somalia’s pre-colonial history of societal relations insinuated a stateless society 
bereft of the edifice and parameters of centralised institutions. The lack of an institutionalized 
hierarchy offered a sense of individual independence and of egalitarianism characterised by 
decision-making process grounded in “pastoral democracy” (Simons, 2012; Issa-Salwe, 1996). 
Kinship political power was distributed among the entire community. All male adults were clan 
elders and had the right to participate in the clan decision-making process. The function of the 
clan leader (who was elected on the basis of valued skills) was merely to preside over clan 
gatherings or shir but had no formal executive authority over the people or over the decision 
making process as all decisions were reached on the basis of consensus (Issa-Salwe, 1996). 
Accordingly, Lewis (1961), referenced in Issa-Salwe (1996: 8), observed that “…. the office 
of clan-head is generally little more than a nominal title corresponding to the degree of social 
and territorial exclusiveness which the clan, more than other orders of grouping, possess”. All 
decisions were guided by well-defined customary laws and communal social contracts (xeer).    
 
Although external influences on the pure form of the Somali’s traditional ‘pastoral democracy’ 
dated back to as early as the 10th century, it was not until the establishment of European 
colonial rule that the impacts of these influences became pervasive leaving an enduring legacy 
behind. The arbitrary partitioning of the Somali-inhibited territories among three colonial 
powers did not only leave the Somalis separated into five distinct administrative units but also 
left them become ‘a nation in search of a state’ (Laitin and Samatar, 1987)-an ever elusive 
endeavour that would later set the stage for a sequence of events (or critical junctures) that 
would prove catastrophic to both a viable future Somali statehood and the Somali populace.    
Apart from the territorial aspect, colonial rule have profoundly affected the socio-economic 
and political aspect of traditional Somali Society. Walls and Kibble (2010), argue that the 
introduction of foreign legal systems and centralized authority disrupted existing power 
structures, and hence, clan relations. Moreover, the integration of the rural and urban economy 
into the world economy have led to the commercialization previously subsistence based 
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pastoral economy, thereby creating demand for mass production which benefited urban 
merchants more than rural producers (Walls and Kibble, 2010; Bryden and Steiner, 1998; 
Osman, 2007).  
Similarly, colonialism allowed the emergence of a small clique of urban based merchants, 
(western) educated political elite and bureaucrats whose loyalty shifted from the clan solidarity 
and would take control of the reins of power on independence, thus, creating social inequalities 
between the overwhelming rural majority and them (Bryden and Steiner, 1998; Walls and 
Kibble, 2010). Moreover, Osman (2007) argues that these ‘favoured’ groups were from specific 
regions of the country and belonged to particular clans, meaning that independent Somalia state 
was largely to be dominated by these groups. Furthermore, colonial administration both in the 
South and North appointed salaried clan chiefs to work with them which had the effect of 
causing tensions within the clan, sub-clans and across clans as the elevation of an individual to 
represent the clan affairs was in contradiction to the egalitarian system of ‘pastoral democracy’ 
(Hesse, 2010). Additionally, the distinct British and Italian administrative and legal systems of 
governance as well as languages would become a daunting difficulty that the new state of 
Somalia would grapple with once the two former colonies form a union in 1960.  
In sum, Bryden and Steiner (1998: 11) succinctly put the overall impact of colonial rule as 
follows:  
        “imposition of central state authority; co-opting of traditional leaders to fulfil political or 
administrative functions; unequal access to the advantages (‘distributive goods’) of imperial 
rule, favouring some clans over others; and the evolution of a small but relatively privileged, 
educated, urban elite”.  
 
Nonetheless, a critical juncture that would trigger spontaneous, far-reaching nationalistic 
reaction was the handing over or return of Somali-inhibited territories to Ethiopia by Britain 
towards the end of colonial rule. 
 
              7.2.1. The return of Somali-inhabited territories to Ethiopia 
 
Although the history of Somali nationalism has its roots in 16th century and early 20th century 
figures such as, respectively, Ahmed Al-Ghazi, Gurey and Sayyid Abdulle Hassan (known to 
the British as ‘Mad Mullah’) who waged resistance or ‘Jihad’ against foreign invaders, it was 
reinvigorated in 1941 when all the Somali-inhabited territories, save for French Somaliland, 
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came under Britain following the expulsion of the Italians from the South by the British during 
the WWII (Balthasar, 2014; Issa-Salwe, 1996). With the support of the British, Southern 
Somalis formed nationalist political parties and entertained the prospects of a unified Somalia 
gaining independence from Britain. Independence and unification with the South was not on 
the agenda of the Northerners at this point. However, in 1948 Britain ceded the Ogaden region 
of Somalia to Ethiopia much to the consternation of the Somalis in the South who vehemently 
protested against this decision. Again when, in 1954, Britain returned the Haud and Reserved 
Areas to Ethiopia, the people in the North were angered and responded with the formation 
nationalists’ parties that promised to fight for the return of their lands (Balthasar, 2014; Issa-
Salwe, 1996). Commenting on these developments, one Somali observer remarked:  
 
         “Had it not been for the handing over of those territories, so vital to the transhumanic 
life pattern of herdsmen and herds alike, there would hardly have been the emotional desire 
for an immediate union with the South, nor even the demand for immediate independence” 
(Ghalib, 2015 quoted in Balthasar, 2014: 228). 
  
Accordingly, this was the act that finally pushed the former British protectorate in the North to 
actively seek independence from Britain and hastily unify with the South in order to reclaim 
not only their land from Ethiopia but to realize the dream of a ‘Greater Somalia’. In this sense, 
the return of Haud and reserved Area as well as Ogaden to Ethiopia was a critical juncture that 
would impact the future of Somalia in a profound and negative manner.  
 
     7.3. On the wrong Foot: Hasty Unification, Dysfunctional Democracy and Discontent 
 
 
On July 1 1960, the Northern British protectorate and Southern Italian colony merged to form 
the republic of Somalia after having achieved independence from their respective colonizers. 
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the unification of the two former colonies was ill-
prepared and rushed as the decision was informed (causally linked) by impulsive nationalistic 
sentiments born out of the indignation related territorial loss rather than the exigencies of logic 
and thoughtful considerations such a weighty matter required (Balthasar, 2014). Independence 
would present the embryonic Somali state with both a formidable challenge and a unique 
opportunity concerning its state formation trajectory. This, I would argue, was a critical 
juncture in Somalia’s history. On the one hand, the new Somalia inherited a colonial system of 
62 
   
political governance, bureaucratic administration and judicial codes that were not only foreign 
to them but also were in contradiction to their culture and political organization. On the other 
hand, this was a momentous moment for the Somalis to lay the foundations for new governance 
institutions that were both modern, democratic and in harmony with the reality of traditional 
Somali culture and society.  
(Un)fortunately, the new Somali state adopted a western model of multiparty representative 
democracy. The tenets and practices of democracy, beyond chaotic party elections and 
freedoms, were however missing. The political parties were clan based, too many, fragmented 
and lacked any distinctive ideologies. For instance, over sixty political parties and 1000 
contestants participated for 123 parliamentary seats in the 1969 elections (Balthasar, 2014; 
Issa-Salwe, 1996). Individuals sought power to enrich themselves and their kinsmen and state 
became the new arena for predatory competition for resources. The politicians made neither 
the interest nor commitment to bring about social and economic transformations (Issa-Salwe, 
1996). Strapped for much needed resources and dearth of leadership with political experience 
and acumen to steer the country in the right direction, the statehood experiment was doomed 
to fail.  
The government made little effort to mobilize domestic revenue to finance its budgetary 
activities and therefore became heavily dependent on outside help-a fact that had impacted 
governance, accountability and development of the country. Accordingly, the first postcolonial 
civil government (1960-9) of Somalia became riddled with political turmoil, clan politics, 
greed, corruption, nepotism and incompetence (Balthasar, 2014).   The new crops of politicians 
actively sought to marginalize the existing traditional authorities and clan systems rather than 
accommodating them. They regarded them as “divisive, antiquated, in the way of 
modernization, and a vestige of colonial imperialism” even stamping out the status of the clan 
in a constitutional provision (Balthasar, 2014: 231). Despite this official pronouncement, the 
traditional institution of the clan proved to be resilient especially when there was no effective 
system to supplant it. The politicians depended on their clans for elections and the government 
continued the colonial practice of co-opting clan elders by paying them stipends. Moreover, 
cabinet formation was done largely by following clan balance (Ibid).   
In addition, the rushed and ill-prepared unification immediately brought to the fore many issues 
regarding governance and power sharing between the merger partners. These issues have been 
discussed quite in a detail above (see section 4.1.2). But it is important to note here that early 
discontent and grievances resulting from the bungled unification mainly due to plurality of 
systems and identities inherited from colonial rule contributed to the dysfunctional nature of 
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the politics of the civilian administration, eventually triggering the civil war and state break 
down. In retrospect, the path taken by the political elite at this critical historic moment was one 
that would cause tremendous suffering to the people along the way and ultimately culminate 
into the destruction of the state itself. In this sense, it can be argued that the Somali state 
formation did not go wrong (somewhere along the way); it started on the wrong foot. The 
assassination of the president created a power vacuum, which, when the fragmented parliament 
failed to fill, led the military to intervene.  
 
     7.4. Military Dictatorship, Cold War Geopolitics and the Ogaden War 
 
 
The triple legacies of military dictatorship, cold war geopolitics as well as the devastating 
Ethiopian-Somali interstate war (known as the Ogaden war) have perhaps had more enduring 
impact on the state formation project and subsequent events than any other previously 
witnessed episodes. Following the flagrant failure of nine years of civilian (mis-)rule, the 
apogee of which was the assassination of the president in October 1969, the military intervened 
and took over power in a bloodless putsch much to the relief of the disillusioned population 
who welcomed the change (Simons, 2012; Issa-Salwe, 1996). The military took over of power 
was a critical juncture that had profound impact on the Somalia state formation trajectory as 
well state-society relations. As I have detailed before, the military regime made some attempts 
to address some of the ailments that had bedevilled and crippled the civilian administration. In 
the beginning of its rule (until 1974), the military regime made some economic and social 
progress under the “scientific socialism” ideology, albeit being undemocratic. Nevertheless, as 
the regime tightened its hold on power, it increasingly became more dictatorial, hence, turning 
an already bad situation to what can be described as “Kud ka guur oo qanjo u guur” (a Somali 
phrase, roughly equivalent to the English phrase: Out of the frying ban into the fire). 
Under the military regime corruption, nepotism, economic mismanagement and divisive clan 
politics were taken to new levels. The leaders of the regime preached against and actively 
denounced clannism in public while they themselves practised by concentrating state power 
and resources in the hands of an alliance few clans (the so-called MOD alliance) at the 
exclusion of the rest. Any criticism or opposition was ruthlessly and violently suppressed. No 
wonder, clan divisions and distrust grew deeper in this period. The institutions of the traditional 
authorities suffered from further marginalization, manipulation and suppression (Issa-Salwe, 
1996; Simons, 2012; Osman, 2007). 
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Another critical juncture influenced by pan-Somali nationalism or ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology 
was the Ogaden war of 1977-8. In 1977, the military regime waged a war against Ethiopia in 
order to annex the Somali-inhibited region of Ogaden and fulfil a long held ambition of uniting 
the Somali nation under one state. As I have explained it, Somalia lost the war and suffered a 
tremendous human and economic cost. The defeat also marked the end of Somalia’s ambition 
to create a ‘Greater Somalia’ (Terdman, 2008). More importantly, the political fallout that 
followed the defeat was even more costly as it did not only trigger a sequence of reactionary 
events that would threaten the survival of the regime but would also eventually result in the 
collapse of the Somali state. Immediately after the Ogaden conflict, there was a failed coup 
attempt against the regime by some disgruntled top military officers who returned from the 
conflict. The regime reacted swiftly and executed the ringleaders who were mainly from the 
Majeerteen clan. Those who survived the purge, led by Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf, fled to 
Ethiopia and formed an opposition armed group-the Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF). The government targeted the entire sub-clan of the SSDF leader and punished them 
collectively (Terdman, 2008). Continued disaffection with the state’s abuses led to the rise of 
other opposition groups like SNM in the North and USC in the South, which challenged the 
regime. The military unleashed terror against the opposition and increased its suppression. 
Due to its strategic location in the context of cold war geopolitics, the military regime just like 
its civilian predecessor found willing sponsors of its excesses with impunity. Somalia received 
substantial amount of military and financial aid from both the former Soviet Union and the 
USA as it cleverly exploited their rivalries and played off against each other; it switched sides 
and served as a client of both at different points (Menkhaus, 2014). As a result, Somalia become 
one of the heaviest militarized states in Africa, a fact that emboldened it in the first place to 
wage a costly war on Ethiopia. Moreover, the flow of foreign assistance sustained the regime 
as it could use its military might to suppress opposition and maintain law and order.  However, 
as the cold war competition ebbed towards the end of the 1980s, Somalia lost its strategic value 
and therefore, foreign aid started to dry up especially in the wake of the state’s heavy 
handedness in dealing with the SNM armed opposition in the North. So, dearth of its main 
source of revenue, the State became unsustainable and ultimately crumpled in 1991 (Wam and 
Sardesai, 2005).  
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     7.5. Post-State Collapse aftermaths: Fragmentation, Interventions & Divergent  
             Outcomes 
                 
         7.5.1. State Collapse: The road to the fragmentation & Emergence of Multiple, 
                   Divergent Somalia (s)  
 
 
The violent overthrow of the military regime in January 1991 marked the beginning of the 
official collapse of the Somali state and subsequently state fragmentation. The country 
descended into a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’. The clan based armed factions especially 
the USC that ousted the government from the capital, Mogadishu, had no post-regime plan to 
constitute a replacement and could not reach an agreement. Therefore, with the common enemy 
that united them out of the way, they trained their guns against each other and on everyone 
else. Lethal combinations of a very large number of unemployed youth, easy access to 
weaponry and a deep atmosphere of clan division caused unprecedented scale of anarchy in 
most parts of the country. Leadership dispute among the militia leaders resulted into high death 
toll, massive displacement and destruction of the capital and beyond.  
 
Menkhaus (2011) attributes three more factors to the aforementioned quagmire. First and 
related (causally linked) to an already mentioned point is the legacy of divide and rule policies 
of the regime leadership that sow the seeds of suspicion and polarization between clans. 
Second, the victories USC militias engaged in a spate of retributive assaults on pro-regime 
clans producing a huge surge in ethnic cleansing across the country- an act that forced nearly 
all Somalis to retreat to their original clan bases for protection. This clan balkanization and 
polarization would make future reconciliation process an insurmountable task. Moreover, some 
militarily powerful clans dislodged other clans from the capital and agriculturally productive 
riverine farms and occupied public and private properties by force. These occupiers would 
become ‘peace spoilers’ since the return of law and order would require them to relinquish 
these properties. Third, out of the anarchy, a war economy that was highly profitable for militias 
and their leaders suddenly emerged. Loosely controlled unpaid militias resorted to pillaging 
public and private assets; and extortion of emergency aid that was meant to feed the starving 
and hungry.  
Menkhaus, further, observes that the conflict that emanated from grievances against a 
repressive regime degenerated into greed for resources as opportunities to profit from engaging 
in criminal enterprises increased in the absence of a government. Hence, the Somali case study 
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supports the ‘greed versus grievances’ thesis. The Somali predicament was further aggravated 
by the absence any strong alternative authority like traditional authority or civil society due to 
years of systematic marginalization of these authorities by both the colonialists and subsequent 
post-colonial administrations. Consequently, the vacuum was filled by callous warlords whose 
interests were better served in the continuation of the conflict; their action causing further 
grievances and exacerbation of clan polarization. While this was largely the situation in the 
South and Central Somalia, the North had taken a divergent path. Somaliland, in the northwest 
of the country has declared its secession from the South in 1991 and had embarked on a 
‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding and state-building process. In 1998, Puntland in the northeast had 
adopted similar ‘bottom-up’ strategy to form an autonomous state. In this regard, state collapse 
is viewed as a critical juncture that would not only exacerbate an already existing crisis but 
would also add new layers of challenges to crisis: interventions and state fragmentation. These 
interventions would, in turn, push the problems to new dimensions and so on. The 
fragmentation would produce divergent outcomes for the abovementioned regions of the 
country.   
 
  7.6. The Interventions: Top-down peacebuilding & State-building in the South-Central 
 
          7.6.1. UN Humanitarian Intervention (1992-5) 
 
In chapter 5, I have discussed the circumstances that led to the UN/US humanitarian 
intervention in Somalia and I have also provided some analysis on how a promising historic 
mission of such a scale ended up in failure. Here, I will briefly offer further analysis on the 
overall impact of the mission on the dynamics of the conflict.  
A Life and Peace Institute (1995) study, [quoted in Ahmed and Green (1999)] succinctly point 
out major flaws that crippled the mission’s effectiveness. It states that:  
 
        “The Operation’s mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process and was 
open to myriad interpretations. The mandate changed from protecting the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and maintaining `secure environment’, to capturing 
a leader of one of the factions at one stage and, later, to encouraging negotiations with that 
same leader. As a consequence, UNOSOM was bedevilled with disagreements among the 
various players” (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 122).  
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Ahmed and Green (1999: 121) further argue that the intervention came “tragically late” i.e. 
deployment occurred one year after the fall of the regime in which the subsequent fighting and 
famine had already claimed the lives of more than a quarter of a million people. Even then, the 
mission lacked any real grasp of the complex nature of the crisis and the reality of Somali social 
organization. The one person (ambassador Sahnoun) who actually understood the situation well 
and was making progress on the ground had to unceremoniously resign due frustration with the 
UN’s narrow view of the crisis which sought myopic quick fix solutions (Simons, 2012).  
Furthermore, the mission viewed the crisis primarily through the lens of humanitarian 
emergency meaning that other pertinent complementary issues for a successful intervention 
such as the widespread insecurity; disarmament and rehabilitation; confidence building and so 
on were ignored (Brons, 2001). When attempts were made at disarmament and demobilisation, 
it was done half-heartedly and inconsistently. Similarly, rather than addressing the widespread 
violence, UNOSOM, through poor judgement, triggered more violence when it became a party 
to the conflict and engaged in a deadly manhunt of one of the warlords (General Aideed) 
ultimately resulting in the deaths of 135 UN troops and hundreds of Somalis including children 
and women (Brons, 2001).   
More crucially, the UN’s action of dealing with warlords did not only exclude other legitimate 
stakeholders in the society but also sent the wrong signal that only those (clans) and individuals 
who possess military power and terrorize the population will be part of any future political 
arrangement. Moreover, the mission injected billions of US dollars into the war economy 
especially in the capital where its operations were concentrated. This created powerful warlords 
and businessmen in Mogadishu who would later become ‘spoilers’ of peace since they 
continued to profit in the state of conflict (Menkhaus, 2003).  
In a nutshell, the UN/US humanitarian mission compounded the Somali crisis by: fuelling the 
war economy; recognizing and legitimizing warlords; marginalizing alternative legitimate 
authorities; pursuing short term quick fix solutions to a complex problem; prioritizing top-down 
state-building solution without engaging in genuine reconciliation efforts-a fact that will, 
unfortunately, create path dependency in future efforts to reconstitute the Somali state. As a 
result, after nearly three years, the UN finally withdrew its operations and left the Somalis at 
the mercy of more emboldened and more powerful unscrupulous warlords.  
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          7.6.2. Post-UN Interventions: Regional Diplomacy & the War on Terror 
 
 
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the international community have made over a 
dozen attempts to rebuild the failed state. These top-down state-building experiments have, 
without exception, failed to either to end the civil war or reconstitute a central authority for 
Somalia (Pham, 2013; Menkhaus, 2003). Only the TNG (2000-03) and the TFGs (2004-2012) 
have resulted in something worth writing about as all the other attempts never saw the light of 
day. The TNG, which was formed in Djibouti in 2000, became dysfunctional due a combination 
of internal and external factors (for more detail see section 5.3.2). The TFG was formed in 
Kenya in a long flawed process that lasted for two years. After the failed UN interventions, 
peacebuilding and state-building efforts were assumed by regional actors (see section, 5.3.1) 
The formation of the TFG occurred in the context of post-9/11, where the war on terror 
campaign has renewed the US’s interest in Somalia. This was another critical juncture that had 
triggered a chain of reactions that had thrown Somalia deeper into new levels of conflict 
protraction. Ethiopia’s hand in the establishment of the TFG which was widely seen as 
illegitimate government coupled with the US’s action to enlist warlords as partners in their 
counterterrorism efforts in Somalia provoked a counter reaction from a popular movement led 
by an alliance of Islamic courts (known as CIU) and businessmen. The rise of the CIU, in turn, 
led to the invasion of Ethiopia into Somalia with the tacit approval of the USA. Similarly, the 
Ethiopian invasion and subsequent occupation led to the emergence of a radical group called 
Al-Shabaab. The result of Ethiopia’s two-year occupation was a complex insurgency against 
Ethiopia and the TFG forces that created untold suffering and violence never witnessed before 
during the civil war (Menkhaus, 2007; 2011).  
Ethiopia’s withdrawal in early 2009 in a deal brokered by the UN in Djibouti that saw the 
incorporation of some former UIC leaders into the TFG (the CIU chairman was elected 
president) and deployment of AMISOM peacekeepers did not help the situation. In fact, Al-
Shabaab became more powerful and occupied all the towns vacated by the Ethiopian forces 
immediately such that it controlled nearly all of South and Central Somalia including more 
than half of Mogadishu, the seat of the AMISOM protected government. The US’s targeted 
drone attacks on the group’s leadership and its designation as a terrorist organization in 2008 
is believed to have pushed Al-Shabaab, which had a local agenda into becoming a global 
jihadist group (Pham, 2013). Al-Shabaab declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and started to 
actively recruit foreign jihadists from all over the world. It had also carried out deadly terror 
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attacks outside Somalia multiple times especially in Kenya and Uganda. Today, Al-Shabaab is 
the most significant obstacle to the peace and political reconstruction of Somalia.  
One of the major reasons for the ineffectiveness of the internationally driven top-down 
approach to state-building is aptly described by professor Menkhaus as:  
 
       “...there is perhaps no other issue on which the worldviews of external actors and Somalis 
are more divergent than their radically different understanding of the state. For external 
actors, …. a responsive and effective state is an essential prerequisite for development…For 
Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering 
those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population.  These different 
perceptions of the state often result in external and national actors talking past one another 
rather than with one another in discussions about the rebuilding of the central government” 
(Menkhaus, 2003: 409-10). 
 
As a consequence, he concludes, the Somalis view the state-building as a zero-sum game where 
winners will use it to benefit themselves at the expense of the losers. This fear is informed by 
years of experience under a predatory and repressive government.  
In sum, from the discussions offered throughout the thesis, a number of observations can be 
made pertaining to the failure of the international efforts to peacebuilding and state-building in 
the South. These failures are due to the interplay of complex and multifaceted webs of internal 
and external factors. They range from those negative experiences and legacies rooted in the 
past (colonial legacy, post-independence state repression, corruption, clannism, bad 
governance) to external regional interferences and proxy wars; ill-advised international 
policies; war economy; the war on terror; lack of strong, visionary leadership; clan politics; 
poverty, corruption; radicalism and so on. And as the crisis became more protracted and as the 
geopolitical environment transformed (e.g. in the aftermath of 9/11) the dynamics and the 
actors evolved and finding viable solutions became ever more elusive. In this regard, it would 
be wrong and oversimplification to attribute the failure of peaceful solution to the conflict to 
one or a few external or internal causes. This thesis rejects such an approach as reductionist 
and insufficient.  
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    7.7. Other Somalia (s): Bottom-up State-building and Peacebuilding in the North  
 
 
Somaliland and Puntland have travelled divergent paths in their peacebuilding and state-
building trajectories than the one taken by the South and central Somalia; producing outcomes 
that are very contrasting. While the latter has pursued the externally driven top-down approach 
explained above, the former two have chosen a locally driven bottom-up approach. The details 
of the processes, actors, circumstances as well as the outcomes of these different approaches 
have been discussed in the above chapters. In other words, the ‘how’ and ‘what’ have already 
being answered. This section will answer the ‘why’. Why did the people of the North and the 
South adopt diverse approaches when faced with the same problem of state collapse? And why 
did they achieve better results than the South & central? Part of the answer can be traced back 
in the distant past (during colonialism) as well as the different experiences under the state 
during post-colonial period. The relevance of the past in explaining the present fits with the 
theory of path dependency (i.e. history matters). The other part is explained by what transpired 
in the immediate aftermath of post-1991 state collapse. I will place much emphasis on 
Somaliland in relation to South and central Somalia. This is because Puntland adopted a similar 
model and Somaliland is the more successful and exceptional (having declared independence) 
of the two polities in the North.  
The different colonial experiences of the North and the South under different colonialists have 
exposed their pre-colonial structures of governance to diverse degrees of disruptions. In the 
South and central, the direct rule of the Italians has significantly altered the traditional systems 
of social organization while the impact was less in the North where the British had exercised 
indirect rule (Leonard and Samantar, 2011; Kenning, 2011). Again, the northern regions have 
largely avoided the post-colonial Somalia’s administrations attempts to interfere with 
traditional authorities and structures due to their remoteness from the centre, Mogadishu. 
Moreover, the feeling of economic marginalization, social disenfranchisement and persecution 
(later by the military regime) made the northern people to turn to their lineage social networks 
for cohesion and survival. As a result, these regions’ socio-economic and political organization 
of societal relations have remained relatively stronger, functional and relevant (Bradbury et. al, 
2003).  
As much as the above stated pre-state collapse historical and political developments have 
helped lay favourable foundations for Somaliland and Puntland, differing circumstances and 
the actions of major actors in post-state collapse are equally important in explaining the 
differences in outcomes i.e. the relative peace in the north and the chaos in the South.  
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To begin with, SNM, the first anti-regime opposition movement formed by the northern Isaaq 
people, differed from other opposition armed movements in the South in a number of 
significant ways. It was formed almost a decade earlier than other groups which emerged in 
late 1980s, just a year or two before the failure of the state. This had given SNM not only 
military experience but also organizational capacity; and administrative and political 
experience. Moreover, the organization was democratic as it conducted periodic elections for 
its leaders; it operated as a unified front against the regime; was popular among the Isaaq clan; 
and most importantly incorporated traditional leadership (Guurti) into its governance structure 
in order to mobilise resources (human and financial) and give legitimacy to their course as well 
as act as an advisory body (Renders and Terlinden, 2010; walls and Kibble, 2010). This would 
make the people and the clan leaders as major stakeholders in the organization- a fact that 
would make post-1991 negotiation and state-building relatively less complex. As a 
consequence, the political landscape in Somaliland was more favourable for peacebuilding and 
state-building as compared to the South and central Somalia.  
Additionally, in the aftermath of the ouster of the military regime, the SNM and the SSDF 
became the dominant military groups in the northwest (Somaliland) and in the northeast 
(Puntland) respectively. The two clans that formed these movements were also the dominant 
clans in these regions. Consequently, the other clans in these regions who were minorities and 
who supported the regime’s crackdown against the two respective dominant opposition clans 
had no choice but to accept reconciliation (Balthasar, 2014). Moreover, following the defeat of 
the regime by the opposition groups, SNM, which captured all the territories in the northwest, 
did not engage in retaliatory actions against other clans, rather, it pursued the path of 
forgiveness, reconciliation and negotiations (Pham, 2013). This was not the case in the South. 
This is because, the clan structure in the South is more heterogeneously balanced and no clear 
militarily dominant group emerged as the USC, which could have become dominant split 
shortly after the fall of the government and engaged in internecine conflict among themselves 
over leadership dispute. Moreover, the USC pursued retributive acts that amounted to clan 
cleansing and massive lootings of properties occurred across all regions in the South. This 
further deepened the existing clan cleavages and created a war economy-two elements that 
would become major obstacles in future reconciliation efforts in South and central Somalia 
(Menkhaus, 2011; Kapteijns, 2013). Therefore, it is the actions of key actors in the conflict at 
this critical juncture of state collapse that had defined the subsequent trajectory of the crisis 
for the two regions.   
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Consequently, the democratic nature of the SNM, its military dominance, the feeling of 
collective persecution among the people and the already institutionalized and empowered clan 
elders created a conducive environment where peacebuilding and political reconstruction can 
take place. Traditional clan elders spearheaded series of preparatory negotiation and 
reconciliation meetings at local sub-clan levels that would culminate into national 
reconciliation conferences. In these meetings, (sub) clan representatives dealt with outstanding 
grievances and reached agreements before moving to the question of political representation 
and reconstruction at the national level. And this arrangement has been repeated throughout 
the entire tumultuous periods in the 1990s (Walls, 2009; Eubank, 2011). Moreover, Unlike the 
South, the absence of external influence throughout the process has given Somaliland and 
Puntland the opportunity to engage in grassroots bottom-up peacebuilding and state-building 
process tailored to the reality of their specific needs (Kenning, 2011). The fact that the entire 
process was transparent and local (in terms of its agenda, the funding and outcome) allowed it 
not only to proceed at its natural course but also offered it a sense of legitimacy and ownership 
(Bradbury et. al, 2003). Another factor was that, the unabated suffering and crisis in the South 
offered the people of Somaliland and Puntland a strong incentive to find a common solution as 
the alternative was too grave to even contemplate (Walls, 2009).  
More crucially, Somaliland institutionalized traditional clan leadership into the governance 
structure of the state in a system of hybrid political order. This system gave the government 
legitimacy and served as checks and balances (Hesse, 2010; Eubank, 2011). Besides, the clan 
elders played a vital role in maintaining peace and engaging in mediation whenever peace was 
threatened.  
Furthermore, Balthasar (2013) offers an interesting perspective about Somaliland’s success in 
its state-making project especially during president Igal’s years. He postulates that it was the 
political shrewdness and ‘war projects’ of president Igal that had played the biggest role in 
advancing Somaliland’s state-making endeavour and democracy more than the often 
romanticized bottom-up approach. With a deep understanding of clan politics, he argues 
further, Igal first used the euphoria of nationhood and statehood to secure revenue, improve 
security (conducted DDR and established a national army) and lay the foundation for the young 
polity. However, the political landscape was shaky, peace was still fragile and authority was 
decentralized due to competing authorities. To counter this problem, according to this 
perspective, Igal provoked and fuelled a ‘war project’ between 1994 and 1996 for state making 
(borrowing Tilly’s thought of war making as state making). Even though the war was 
devastating, it allowed Igal to spread the authority of his government and consolidate his 
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power. He managed to eliminate political rivals and co-opt the Guurti. After the war, Igal was 
re-elected for a second term, a new constitution was written and ratified in a national 
referendum. The constitution transformed Somaliland from a clan-based system of government 
to multiparty democracy. Hence, he concludes, it was Igal’s political shrewdness and his 
ruthlessness in starting a civil war that advanced the state-making project in Somaliland.  
 
The table below demonstrates a summary of the factors that were responsible for the divergent 
outcomes in the South and central, on the one hand, and the Northern regions i.e. Somaliland 
and Puntland, on the other. Somaliland and Puntland share many similarities and therefore are 
grouped together in one column.  
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Table 1: An overview of the factors that were responsible for the divergent outcomes in 
the South and the Northern regions (SL and PL) 
Factors South  & central Somalia Somaliland (SL) & 
Puntland (PL) 
1. Pre-colonial social 
structure 
-the societies were mainly 
agro-pastoralists 
-their social structure was, 
in comparison to the 
Northerners, more 
hierarchical and less 
decentralized  
-the societies led a nomadic 
life-style 
-their social structure was 
non-hierarchical and highly 
decentralised and 
egalitarian 
2. Colonialism: Diverse 
experiences 
-the Italians exercised 
direct colonial rule in the 
South. 
-this approach was highly 
disruptive of the socio-
economic and political 
organization of the 
traditional society 
-it also led to the 
marginalization and 
manipulation of traditional 
authorities. 
-they experienced indirect 
British rule (especially SL).  
-this rule caused less 
disruption of the socio-
economic and political 
structure of the society 
-traditional authority 
remained relatively intact 
and relevant. 
3. Post-colonial state:  
marginalization & persecution 
-post-independence state 
was dominated by 
politicians from the South 
and central Somalia 
-these politicians 
benefitted their clans and 
were the perpetrators of 
state oppression and 
persecution against the 
Northern clans 
(specifically during the 
military regime).  
-the North, especially SL 
was economically and 
politically disenfranchised.  
-grievances emanating from 
marginalization was 
brutally suppressed by the 
regime ultimately causing 
collective persecution of the 
societies from the North. 
-the regime crackdown of 
armed opposition in SL, for 
example, killed an estimated 
50,000 people and 
destroyed towns (for more 
details, see section 6.2). 
4.       Clan structure and 
military dominance 
-clan structure is 
heterogeneous and 
therefore no particular clan 
emerged militarily 
dominant in the aftermath 
-clan structure is more 
homogenous in comparison 
to the South. For instance, 
the dominant clan in SL is 
75 
   
of the state-collapse. 
Hence, there was/is clan 
power balance in the South. 
-The Hawiye clan led USC, 
which would have been 
dominant split into two 
factions due to leadership 
disputes between its 
leaders.  
  
Isaaq. In PL, Majeerteen is 
the dominant clan.  
-the armed opposition 
movements from these two 
clans were also the 
dominant military group i.e. 
SNM in SL and SSDF in PL. 
Hence, these dominant clans 
could impose their will on 
the other minor clans in their 
respective territories. 
5.           War economy -Due to large scale looting 
and pillaging, a lucrative 
war economy developed 
immediately after the state 
collapse in 1991.  
-Early UN humanitarian 
intervention fuelled the war 
economy by pumping 
billions of dollars into the 
economy. A large part of 
the money went to 
warlords and their militias. 
-those who profited from 
the war economy later 
became powerful actors 
and in many cases ‘peace 
spoilers’ as their interests 
were best served in the 
continuation of the crisis.  
-There was no large scale 
looting and, therefore, no 
war economy developed. 
-Similarly, the UN 
humanitarian intervention 
was largely confined to the 
South. Hence, there was no 
new resources (aid) to 
compete over. 
-Consequently, no group 
(warlords or businessmen) 
emerged which profited 
from the war and had 
interest in the continuation 
of the conflict. 
6.            External interventions -post-state collapse South 
Somalia became a site 
where proxy wars from 
competing regional 
interests were played out 
with negative ramifications 
for the country and its 
population.  
-Direct military 
interventions from 
neighbouring countries and 
the US counterterrorism 
measures had also 
-External international 
interventions were absent in 
both SL and PL. Therefore, 
the communities in these 
territories did not only avoid 
the negative aspects of 
external interventions but 
were also able to pursue 
locally driven alternative 
paths to peacebuilding and 
state-building. 
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destabilizing and 
exacerbating effects. 
-International diplomatic 
interventions (state-
building) aggravated the 
crisis more than it helped. 
7.        The role of traditional 
authority/elders 
-traditional authorities in 
the South were weakened 
due to systematic 
marginalization by both the 
Italian colonialists who 
employed direct rule and 
the independent Somali 
state.  
-Similarly, internationally 
led early diplomatic and 
reconciliation efforts side-
lined traditional authorities 
in favour of armed factions 
and warlords.   
-therefore, the role of 
traditional elders in 
peacebuilding and 
reconciliation was limited 
in the South.  
-in the North, especially in 
SL, traditional 
authorities/structures were 
less interfered with due to 
the indirect rule adopted by 
the British colonialists.  
-Similarly, the independent 
Somali state’s impacts on 
these authorities were 
relatively limited due to the 
remoteness of the Northern 
territories from Mogadishu 
(the centre of power). 
Hence, they remained 
crucially relevant actors in 
post-state collapse Somalia. 
-traditional elders played a 
very significant role in 
peacebuilding and state-
building.  
8.         Top-down vs bottom-
up peacebuilding & state-
building 
-peacebuilding and state-
building efforts in the 
South were externally 
driven and adopted top-
down approach. 
-In most cases, 
internationally sponsored 
conferences were held 
outside the country. 
-Also, these efforts pursued 
power sharing agreements 
that focussed on state-
building without any 
genuine reconciliation. 
-this approach which has 
been repeated in more than 
a dozen times has tragically 
-SL and PL adopted locally 
driven and sponsored 
bottom-up approach to 
peacebuilding and state-
building. 
- Lengthy, inclusive and 
consensus based 
reconciliation conferences 
were held inside the country 
where outstanding 
grievances were first 
resolved before handling 
questions on power sharing 
and state-building. 
-this approach has proven to 
be more successful in 
producing peaceful results 
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failed to bring peace and/or 
establish a stable 
government.  
and in establishing stable 
democratic governance 
structures in both SL and 
PL. 
9.               Leadership factor -poor leadership is cited as 
a factor, which had 
contributed to the unending 
crisis in the South.  
-no strong leader(s), 
militarily or otherwise, that 
could steer the country out 
of the political turmoil had 
emerged ever since the 
collapse of the state. 
-and the political elite have 
been self-serving, greedy 
and corrupt individuals 
who do not hesitate to 
become ‘peace-spoilers’ if 
their interest is not served.    
-in both SL and PL, 
respectively, the leaders of 
SNM and SSDF emerged as 
the only dominant force in 
the immediate post-state 
collapse  period and went on 
to form the first political 
governance structures. 
-in Somaliland, president 
Igal (1993-2002) is credited 
to have been the most 
significant actor in SL’s 
success. 
-he used his charisma, 
experience and political 
shrewd to advance 
Somaliland’s state-making 
and democratic trajectory 
(see section 7.7 for more 
details).  
10.             Extremism -the rise of Al-shabaab 
over a decade ago has 
completely transformed the 
trajectory of the crisis into 
a more deadly and 
dangerous level never 
witnessed before.  
- Al-shabaab remains the 
most singular threat to 
peace and security not only 
in Somalia but also in the 
Horn of Africa. They are 
also the most significant 
obstacle to the return of 
effective Somali state and 
government.   
-the rise of Al-shabaab  was 
largely due to the long- 
standing power vacuum in 
the South. 
However, both polities and 
had political and security 
structures in place which 
successfully prevented 
extremism from taking a 
foothold in those territories, 
in the first place. 
-Attempts by Al-shabaab to 
penetrate these areas were 
also successfully repulsed.  
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     7.8. Conclusion 
 
This research has undertaken to investigate the intriguing case study of Somalia. The analysis 
of the Somalia crisis, having confounded many scholars and analysts repeatedly for nearly three 
decades, required a unique approach that looks into the case from multiple angles. The main 
research question under consideration was:  What are main factors that explain the 
fragmentation of the Somali state and emergence of multiple, divergent polities following the 
collapse of the state? The journey towards finding answers to this question began with asking 
and answering a number of subsidiary questions: What were the origins of the conflict that led 
to the fragmentation in the first place? Why did the conflict endure so long? Why did 
peacebuilding and state-building efforts to end the conflict fail? Why did Somaliland and 
Puntland adopt a divergent approach and succeed where the South and central of the country 
had failed? 
The journey then proceeded to locate the case study in the wider study of conflicts, 
peacebuilding and state-building by reviewing relevant literature (e.g. causes and 
characteristics of conflicts, external interventions, greed and grievances theory) and introduced 
a number of theories that will form the basis for analysis (e.g. PSCs theory, path dependency 
and critical junctures theories). Then, the study offered historical context of the crisis beginning 
from pre-colonial era to colonial rule to post-colonial independence statehood until the collapse 
of the state. Finally, the journey meandered around the vast terrains of the post-state collapse 
landscape passing through Somaliland and Puntland before stopping to reflect and report the 
results by employing process tracing methodology and path dependency and critical junctures 
theories.  
The study found out that the underlying sources of the Somali conflicts are myriad and 
complex. It demonstrated that a complex interplay of internal and external factors whose 
origins can be located in the distant past (colonialism) are responsible for the eruption as well 
as the enduring nature of the crisis. In this regard, the study had identified a number of 
underlying sources of the conflict. They include: colonialism and its legacies; the rushed 
unification of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland; greed (competition for power and 
resources); grievances emanating from state oppression or military dictatorship, corruption, 
nepotism and bad governance; and the Ogaden conflict. Furthermore, the perpetuating factors 
were found to be: the legacy of cold war geopolitics, politicized clan identity and the 
development of profitable war economy.  
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In a similar vein, the reasons for the failure of international efforts to find solutions to the crisis 
are found to be equally as numerous and complex. They include: external regional interferences 
and proxy wars; ill-advised international policies; the development of a war economy; the war 
on terror; lack of strong, visionary leadership; clan politics; poverty, corruption; radicalism and 
so on. While some of the underlying causes of the crisis are still present, new ones have been 
added to it. This is because, as the crisis became more protracted and as the geopolitical 
environment transformed (e.g. in the aftermath of 9/11) the dynamics and the actors evolved 
and finding viable solutions became ever more elusive. In this regard, it would be wrong and 
oversimplification to attribute the failure of peaceful solution to the conflict to one or a few 
external or internal factors. 
Finally, the study found that the success of Somaliland and Puntland in their peacebuilding and 
state-building endeavour vis-à-vis the other regions is due to many factors. Initial conditions 
in the post-1991 state collapse differed between the South and the North. The two regions 
differed in their pre-state collapse historical and political developments; traditional authorities 
remained relatively more influential; and the communities are more homogenous. In the 
aftermath of the state collapse, one dominant military group emerged in both polities i.e. SNM 
in Somaliland and SSDF in Puntland; no war economy developed; there was no external 
intervention; the political leadership was stronger and more visionary; peacebuilding process 
was locally driven, more inclusive and consensus i.e. the communities in these regions adopted 
a bottom-up peacebuilding and state-building approach.       
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Appendix 
 
1. Map showing the territories inhibited by Somali speaking nation which was 
partitioned by European colonial powers 
 
 
Source: http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/topic/should-somaliland-get-recognition-
and-support-from-us/page/2/ 
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2. A map showing Somaliland, Puntland and South-central Somalia 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Global security.org 
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3. A map showing the division of the former republic of Somalia into six (6) 
regional states including Somaliland which claimed independence 
 
 
Source: Chatham House https://somalianewsroom.com/2015/10/23/update-somalia-discusses-
next-steps-for-2016-elections/ 
